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A comprehensive understanding of the bank non-performing loan (NPL) problem is a
prerequisite for any policy recommendations on NPL workout and prevention. This paper
shows the seriousness of the NPL problem in China and analyzes its causes. Section H
refers to different estimates of the total amount of China's NPLs and describes their neg-
ative effects on state banks, the entire banking system, economic reform, and real economic
growth. In Section I, a theoretical framework is established-that the deterioration of
market discipline is the ultimate cause of the NPL problem in China, followed by empirical
analyses in Section IV. Market discipline failed in China due to the dominating role of state
banks in China's financial markets, soft credit to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by state
banks, unnecessary administrative control of banks (credit plan and interest rate control),
weak internal control systems within banks, and inappropriate banking regulations. The
failure of these conditions led to the failure of market discipline of SOEs and state banks
and, consequently, to ruthless lending and borrowing activities, resulting in accumulated
NPLs on state bank balance sheets. Some policy recommendations on NPL workout and
prevention are made in Section V.
Hl. The Seriousness of the NPL Problem in China
A. THE LARGE NUMBER OF EXISTING NPLs AND INCREASING NUMBER OF NEW NPLs
The seriousness of China's NPL problem can hardly be exaggerated. Chinese scholars
estimate that the proportion of NPLs to bank assets have varied from 10 percent to 40
percent.'
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1. Different estimates of the proportion of NPLs to total state commercial banks' assets can be found in the
following publications-ten percent: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR ASSET RESTRUCTURING 31 (Yue Pan ed.,
1997); twenty percent: PBOC Policy Study Office, Issueson Bank and Enterprise Debt Restructuring(1995); 22.3 %:
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Two reasons contribute to the various estimations of scholars: one is that different asset clas-
sification standards were applied; the other is that most of the estimation was based on samples
rather than on statistics. What can be said without doubt is that the huge amount of bad assets
accumulated within [state] banks may have very serious consequences and must be paid close
attention to.2
The ratio of NPLs to total outstanding loans at the big four state commercial banks' was
officially recognized to be 25 percent in 1999. 4 Some foreign observers believe, however,
the ratios are much higher. According to Goldman Sachs, for example, a more stringent
and internationally accepted classification would show that the mainland's banking sector
had one of the highest NPL levels in Asia, ranging from thirty to 60 percent.5
In addition, despite large write-offs in recent years,6 NPL levels have been rising steadily
in China.' It was estimated that new NPLs are being increasingly created on state banks'
books at an annual rate of 2 percent.8 The situation in some areas is even worse.9 A People's
Bank of China (PBOC) report released on April 16, 1999, stated that NPLs rose sharply
Gang Yi, The Asset Structure of China's Financial Institutions and Its Policy Implication, JiNji YANJIU No. 12 (1996);
twenty to thirty percent: Yuncheng Huang, Bank Reform and Debt Restructuring, BEIJING: GUANLI SHIJIE No. 6
(1996); thirty percent: Jingyong Xv, Causes to the Deterioration of the Asset Quality of State Specialized Banks,
DANGDAIJINGJI YANjIU No. 1 (1996); twenty-five to forty percent: Xianxiang Lu, Problems with the Three Lending
Models of China's Commercial Banks, GuoJI JINGRONG YANJIu No. 12 (1996).
2. Qi-jiang Qing, Address at the International Seminar on Bank and Enterprise Debt Restructuring (tran-
script available in the PBOC Policy Study Office).
3. The big four are the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China's Construction Bank
(CCB), the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), and the Bank of China (BOC).
4. The total figure for NPLs includes those that were overdue for less than one year and might be recovered.
There is also a core of bad and doubtful loans that would have to be written off. These amounted to between
seven and ten percent of total lending. See, e.g., Peter Montagnon & James Harding, China to Cut Number of
Non-performing Loans, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 13, 1999, at Asia-Pac. 6. The twenty-five percent ratio rose
from the twenty percent estimation in 1996: the PBOC governor Dai Xianglong said then that eight percent
of outstanding loans at state banks were more than three years overdue and another twelve percent were less
than three years overdue. See, e.g., Seth Faison, China Asserts It Curbs Inflation but Not Robust Growth, N.Y.
TiMEs, July 16, 1996, at D3.
5. The outstanding loans amounted to RMB 9.6 trillion as of March 31, 1999, 110% of the GDP this year.
Xiangwei Wang, Goldman Puts Loan Clean-up Bill at U.S.$272 Billion, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 24,1999,
at 4.
6. It is reported that China wrote off RMB 30 billion (U.S.$3.62 billion) in bad debts in 1997 and RMB
40 billion (U.S.$4.83 billion) in 1998. See China Wrote Off U.S.$3.62 Billion in Bad Debts in 1997, U.S.$4.83
Billion in 1998, at http://www.chinaonline.com/top-stories/breakingnews.c9022405.htl. These two years
write-offs were based on a RMB 23.8 billion write-off in 1996. See PBOC, CHINA FINANCIAL OUTLOOK 1998,
20 (1998).
7. China's banking sector has been increasing loans to inefficient SOEs at a rate that outstrips output
growth, thereby heaping new NPLs on old ones. See, e.g., James Harding, China: Market DifferencesEmphasized,
FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 28, 1999.
8. An article based on an interview with Dai Xianglong, then vice-governor of the central bank, states that
the proportion of NPLs of China's large state-owned banks "has been rising by two percentage points per
annum in recent years." Zhao Yining, The Financial Situation and Financial Reform, LIANGWANG [OUTLOOK],
May 15, 1995, at 12-13.
9. See Economic Research Institute of the State Planning Commission [now the State Development and
Planning Commission], 1995-1996 Hongguan jingii Xinshi Fenxi [Macro-Economic Situation of the Year 1995-
1996] (1996). The research group picked up a state commercial bank branch and found out that NPLs in that
branch at the end of 1994 were RMB 1,162.67 million, seventy times the amount at the end of 1990. Id.
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in the first three months of 1999 in Shenzhen. i° Dai Xianglong, the PBOC governor,
admitted in his speech at the annual session of the National People's Congress (NPC) on
March 11, 1999, that, "owing to the unsatisfactory performance of state-owned enterprises,
the trend of increasing non-performing loans has yet to be checked."I
B. NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF NPLs
1. Negative Effects on State Banks
The NPL problem has been a major obstacle for state commercial banks to be genuinely
commercialized. Huge amounts of bad assets are damaging the profitability and competitive
ability of state commercial banks, and impeding them from improving their economic ef-
ficiency. If the increasing creation of bad assets cannot be curbed effectively, the NPL
problem will eventually lead to the collapse of state banks and consequently the entire
banking system.
a. The Decreasing Profitability of State Commercial Banks
NPLs have direct, decreasing effects on bank profits: banks have to write off and provide
for NPLs, which decreases their profit substantially. The China Construction Bank (CCB),
for example, generated book profits of RMB 2.2 billion (U.S.$266 million) in 1998. The
actual profits, however, were only RMB 850 million (U.S.$102.7 million), down 44 percent
from the RMB 1.51 billion in 1997.12 Zhou Xiaochuan, then the CCB governor, said the
bank experienced an increase in expenditures and a decrease in profits. In addition to the
government's cut in interest rates, adjustments made to the bank's interest receivables, and
the summer floods, he attributed decreased profits to the increase in provisions for the
NPLs.13 As shown in Table 1, the average profit margin of the big four during the period
from 1995 to 1997 was only 0.26 percent and showed a decreasing tendency, while the
profitability of the ten new commercial banks14 during the same period was 1.70 percent
and showed an increasing tendency. One of the reasons that these newly emerged banks
overperformed the big four is that they had a very low NPL level."5
b. The Deteriorating Creditworthiness of State Commercial Banks
The accumulation of NPLs seriously decreases state banks' credit standing, directly ev-
idenced by the downgrading of five Chinese financial institutions by Standard and Poor on
10. It is reported that overdue loans rose by RMB 2.23 billion in the first three months of 1999, an increase
of just over twenty-two percent since the end of December last year; bad debts rose by 1.5%. SeeJames Harding,
Bad Loans Soar in Shenzhen, FIN. TIMEs (London), Apr. 17, 1999, at Int'l 4.
11. James Harding, China to Let Banks Price Lending Risks, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 12, 1999, at Asia-Pac.
6.
12. See, e.g., James Harding, Banks' Profits Come Under Pressure in China, FIN. TIMES (London),Jan. 22, 1999,
at Asia-Pac. 3.
13. Provisions for NPLs rose by RMB 7.9 billion (U.S.$954 million) year on year. See, e.g., China's Top
Five Commercial Banks Report 1998 Account Balances, at http://www.chinaonline.com/top-stories/
today.b9012040.html.
14. They are: Band of Communications, China International Trust and Investment Corporation Industrial
Bank, China Everbright Bank, Huaxia Bank, China Minsheng Banking, Guangdong Development Bank, Shen-
zhen Development Bank, Merchant Bank, Fujian Industrial Bank, and Shanghai Pudong Development Bank.
15. It is estimated that NPLs only account for 2.36% of the outstanding loans of the emerging commercial
banks. See, e.g., Liangchun Yu & Yuan Jv, Monopoly and Competition: Banking Monopoly and Competition in China
[rongduanyujingzheng: zhongguoyinghangye de gaigeyufanzhan], 8 EcoN. REs. J. 48, 55 (1999).
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Table 1
Profit Margins of Banks in China (percentage): 1995-1997
1995 1996 1997 Period Average
The Big Four 0.35 0.32 0.12 0.26
Ten New Commercial Banks 1.68 1.60 1.82 1.70
City Commercial Banks n.a. 2.00 0.91 1.46
Foreign Banks in China 0.73 0.61 0.67 0.67
Source: Table 5 in Liangchun Yu & Yuan Jv, Monopoly and Competition: Banking Monopoly and Competition in
China [rongduanyujingzheng: zhongguoyinghangye de gaigeyufanzhan], 8 EcoN. RESEARCHJ. 48, 53 (1999).
March 1, 1999." Moody's rated China's average bank financial strength at "D", that is,
very weak, in July 1999. That was worse than all other countries being rated except Korea,
Pakistan, Thailand, Indonesia, and Russia. 17
c. The Potential Failure of State Commercial Banks and the Entire Banking System
The accumulation of NPLs has historically been one of the direct causes of bank failures.
In the United States, loan losses dominated the major bank failures from 1934 to 1983.1
The recent bankruptcy of China's second largest international trust and investment cor-
poration, Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation (GITIC), was more
or less due to the large amount of unrecoverable loans. 19
The huge amount of NPLs has already made the big four technically insolvent.2° They
16. See, e.g., James Harding, Downgrade for Five Financial Institutions, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 2, 1999,
at Asia-Pac. 4. Standard & Poor lowered the foreign currency counterpart credit, certificate of deposit, and
debt ratings on five Chinese financial institutions: Bank of China (BOC), Bank of Communications (BOCS),
CCB, China International Trust & Investment Corp. (CITIC), and Industrial & Commercial Bank of China
(ICBC).
17. See Average Bank Financial Strength Rating by Country, MooDY'S INVESTORS SERVICE: BANKING SYSTEM
OUTLOOK: SINGAPORE (July 1999), at 5.
18. See Reid Nagle & Bruce Petersen, Capitalization Problems in Perspective, in HANDBOOK FOR BANKING
STRATEGY, Table 9.2 (Richard C. Aspinwall & Robert A. Eisenbeis eds., 1985). Among the twenty failure cases
that the authors listed in the table, four of them were caused by loan losses.
19. See, e.g., GITIC Had 103 More Subsidiaries Than Previously Reported, Guangdong Government Says, at
http://www.chinaonline.com/industry/financial/newsarchive/secure/1999/feb.. 
./fnc9020802.as. Accordingto
an investigation into the bankruptcy, GITIC's total amount of unrecoverable loans, leased assets, investments,
and interest on account receivable was RMB 9.6 billion (U.S.$1.2 billion), or sixty-five percent of the trust's
net debt. Id.
20. As of 1995, for example, it was revealed that then overdue loans, dead loans, and irrecoverable loans
constituted twelve, eight, and two percent, respectively, of the combined value of the loan portfolios of the big
four. See, e.g., Tang Xiong, How to Regard the Bank's Non-Performing Assets, JINRONG SHIRAO [FIN. NEWS],
Apr. 21, 1996, at 5.
Since the loans outstanding of these four institutions at year-end 1995 stood at RMB 3.9 billion, classified
loans can be estimated at RMB 860 billion. Of these RMB 469 billion were overdue, RMB 313 billion were
dead loans, and RMB 78 billion were irrecoverable. The total net worth of these banks at year-end 1995,
including paid-in capital, surpluses, and retained profits, stood at only RMB 269 billion. Deducting the value
of irrecoverable loans, the net worth of these institutions would be only RMB 191 billion. If the ultimate
recovery rate on the remaining classified loans is less than 3/4, the magnitude of loans to be written off would
exceed the remaining net worth of these banks. See NICHOLAS R. LARDY, CHINA'S UNFINISHED ECONOMIC
REVOLUTION 119 (1998); see also Li Xinxin, Looking at China's Hidden Financial Danger from the Perspective of the
East Asian Financial Crisis: An Analysis of the Utilization and Management of Assets by China's State-Owned Com-
mercial Banks, 3 GAIGE (Beijing) 32 (1998). Li Xinxin is one of the few Chinese authors who has explicitly
acknowledged that the liabilities of the big four exceed their assets.
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are running mainly on the government support and the public's confidence in them.2 Or,
in Nicholas Lardy's words, "the big four are insolvent, but not illiquid."22
Taking into consideration the weight of the state commercial banks in the entire banking
system,23 it would not be exaggerating to assert that if the creation of new NPLs cannot be
effectively curbed, the accumulating NPLs will eventually pull down the state commercial
banks and even the entire banking system in China.
24
2. Negative Effects on the Economic Reform and the Growth of Real Economy
a. Negative Effects on the Economic Reform Toward a Market Economy
The building of a market economy requires the creation of markets, market-oriented
enterprises, and a wide range of institutions and business practices to support them. For
markets to function well there must be a robust entry into, and disciplined exit from, mar-
kets to ensure that the most efficient and innovative producers operate in the markets.
The presence of NPLs on banks' balance sheets distort the incentives for both banks and
SOEs. It has been proven that the large amount of NPLs frequently lead to adverse selection
of bank and firm managers.26 The large amount of NPLs, relative to the capital of lending
banks, suggests that the bank's managers have to bet the bank on the prospect of debtors
paying debts. Lenders are forced to consider a workout loan when borrowers lose access
to financial markets and must seek new loans from existing creditors to continue servicing
outstanding debt.27 The distortion of the lending decision is most extreme if the bank is so
heavily exposed to a borrower that the bank would fail if the workout loan were not made.
In this case, the bank will be willing to make the loan so long as there is some chance-
however negligible-the workout loan will succeed.2" Firms' managers, on the other hand,
21. A survey conducted by the Task Team of the PBOC Huaihua Branch in 1998 shows the public confi-
dence in state-owned commercial banks. See Task Team of the PBOC Huaihua Branch, Depositors' Consciousness
of Financial Risks and the Bank Exit System [chunkuanren de fengxian yishi yu yinghangye de tuichu zhidul, in 9
JINRONGJINGJI (Changsha) 3-6 (1998).
22. See NIcHolAs R. LARDY, THE CHALLENGE OF BANK RESTRUCTURING IN CHINA IN STRENGTHENING THE
BANKING SYSTEM IN CHINA: ISSUES AND EXPERIENCE, 31 (BIS POLICY PAPERS No. 7, Oct. 1999). Lardy lists three
factors that allowed insolvent banks to continue to operate. The first is the rising rate of national savings in
the reform period. The rate was about thirty percent of GDP at the outset of reform but had risen to forty
percent or slightly more by the mid-1990s. Second, the sources of savings have shifted dramatically, so that by
the mid-1990s households accounted for about half of all savings, compared with their negligible share at the
outset of reform. Third, given the tiny size of China's bond and equity markets and the absence of capital
account convertibility, households have had little choice but to hold financial assets either in currency or bank
savings deposits denominated in local currency. The combination of these three factors has meant that ever-
growing amounts of household savings flow into the banks each year. Id. at 31-32.
23. The big four hold 68% of the nation's deposits, seventy-seven percent of all loans, and 75% of the
country's total assets, and employs 66% of those working in the banking sector in 1998. See, e.g., A Look at
Bank Reform in China, Apr. 14, 1999, at http://www.chinaonline.com.
24. See, e.g., Chun Jiang, On the Essence of Finance and Institutional Prerequisites [lun jinrong de shizhi ji zbidu
qiant], 7 EcON. RES.J. 33, 35 (July 1999).
25. See, e.g., European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998: Financial Sector
in Transition, at iv (1998).
26. See, e.g., Richard J. Herring, The Economics of Workout Lending, 21 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 1, 5
(Feb. 1989).
27. See id. at 1.
28. In other words, additional lending to allow bankrupt firms to service the old loans becomes rational, as
it enables banks to report the loans as formally performing, thus delaying the day of reckoning.
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are under no pressure to scrutinize their projects: they know that banks have no alternatives
but to keep lending. In China, the adverse selection is not limited to banks and SOEs. Most
of the adverse selections are under the explicit or implicit instruction of the government.2 9
The banks' passivity in enforcing loan contracts and their willingness to grant new loans
to loss-making SOEs has fostered the reliance of SOEs on state banks and reduced their
willingness and ability to adjust their production to changing demands and respond to
market signals.30 More seriously, adjusting to soft loans from banks, some enterprises cling
to the idea that they do not have a legal obligation to repay loans," while an acute sense of
trust in day-to-day business dealings is essential to business. These negative senses and
behaviors of SOEs impede establishing a market economy in China.'
b. Negative Effects on the Real Economy
It is now well accepted" that the performance of the financial sector has a major influence
on the performance of the overall economy, by mobilizing domestic and foreign savings
and by efficiently allocating these funds to investment opportunities in the real economy;
in addition, a sound financial sector is also a source of stability, providing a mechanism for
allocating risks and spreading financial losses that inevitably arise from economic activity.
The financial crisis in emerging market economies showed how weak banking systems could
damage the economy as a whole.34 As banks are the key providers of funds to industry and
commerce in China, their fragility certainly can have a negative impact on the real economy.
A banking system burdened with a large amount of NPLs is vulnerable to external shocks.
Failures in the financial sector hurt other business and eventually the whole economy."
This has been fully shown in the failure of the GITIC, which led to the liquidity crisis
spreading across China's financial sector--caused by the retreat of international lenders.1
6
29. See Gangming Yang, Empirical Analysis on China SOEs' Bad Debts [zhongguo guoyu qiye buliangfuzhai de
shizhengfengxi], 12 ECON. REs.J. 12, 15 (2000).
30. It is reported that 66.7% of 605 key manufactured products in China were in oversupply. That is, to
some extent, due to weak market responsiveness of SOEs. See, e.g., James Kynge, Chinese Products Seen in
"Oversupply," FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 5, 1999, at Asia-Pac. 4.
31. In 1999, the PBOC and SETC jointly issued the Report on Collecting Bank Interest Arrears According
to Law, which reveals that among all the interest arrears, twenty percent are owed by the debtors who have
the capacity to repay the interest. See Circular of the General Office of the State Council on Issuing the Report
of the PBOC and the SETC on Collecting Bank Interest Arrears According to Law (Jan. 21, 1999).
32. The entire society of China lacks the sense of credit. People do not consider their obligation to repay
debts. See, e.g., Genyun Gu, On Financial Crisis and Its Legal Countermeasures, 12 LAw SCIENCE [FA XuE: StANo-
HAl] 45, 47 (Dec. 1998).
33. There is much literature demonstrating a significant correlation between financial development and
growth, including: Robert G. King & Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Schempeter Might Be Right, 53 QJ.
EcoN. 715 (Aug. 1993); Marco Pagano, Financial Market and Growth: An Overview, 37 EUR. EcoN. REv. 613
(Apr. 1993); and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Financial Market and Development, 5 OXFoRD REv. EcON. POL. 61 (1989).
The positive correlation between financial development and economic growth exists in China as well. See
Ruyong Tan, An Empirical Study of the Relationship Between China's Financial Development and Economic Growth
[zhongguojinrongfanzhang hejingii zhengzhang guanxi de shizheng yanjiu], 10 EcoN. REs. J. JINGp YANJIU] 53
(Oct. 1999).
34. See Rudi Dornbusch & Francesco Giavazzi, Heading off China's Financial Crisis, in STRENGTHENING THE
BANKING SYSTEM IN CHINA: ISSUES AND EXPERIENCE 40 (1999).
35. For an economic analysis, see, for example, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & John Moore, Credit Cycles, 105J. POL.
ECON. 211 (1997).
36. See, e.g., James Harding, Foreign Banks Get Tough with Chinese Borrowers, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 8,
1999, at Asia-Pac. 5;James Harding, Foreign Banks Look to Reduced Role in a Bruised China, FIN. TIMES (London),
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Moreover, the GITIC bankruptcy led directly to the downgrading of China's state-owned
banks and investment companies-Standard and Poor assigned a "junk" rating to China
International Trust and Investment Company (CITIC), the BOC, the CCB, and the
ICBC. 7
Even without external shocks, large amounts of NPLs have negative impacts on the real
economy." Some economists contribute the 1998 growth slowdown in China to excess
capacity in industry, banking sector stress, low consumer confidence, and low export growth.
With regards to banking sector stress, economists point out that the huge amount of NPLs,
combined with the Asian financial crisis, caused tensions in the Chinese government and
the banking sector-banks became cautious about increasing lending, and many projects
with uncertain returns were rejected? 9 There were company complaints that many banks
avoided giving out loans because of rising bad debt levels.-
MI. Causes of Bank NPLs-A Theoretical Framework
Before we start to investigate the causes of NPLs in China, it is important to recognize
that, unlike in Eastern and Central European countries,4I most NPLs of Chinese banks
were not inherited from the pre-reform era. Instead, they were mostly created after reform
began.42 Dai Xianglong stated that the NPL problem in China resulted from the transfor-
mation of the country's economic system.
43
China's economic reform is in transition from a planned economy to a market economy.-
The main idea is for market mechanisms to be the main integrators of the economy-this
Jan. 27, 1999, at Asia-Pac. 5; James Harding, GITIC Failure Hurts Other Businesses, FIN. TIMES (London),Jan.
22, 1999, at Asia-Pac. 3; and Louise Lucas & James Harding, Confidence in China Suffers as GITIC Debt Revealed,
FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 11, 1999, at Asia-Pac. 1.
37. See, e.g., LawrenceJ. Lau, The Macro-economy and Riform of the Banking Sector in China, in STRENGTHENING
THE BANKING SYSTEM IN CHINA: ISSUES AND EXPERIENCE, supra note 34, at 59, 78 (1999).
38. The massive overhang of bad debt stifles new, higher-quality lending by the state banks and acts as a
drag on new economic growth. Banks have to make provisions for these loans. High provisioning needs are
pushing banks to put available cash aside for potential losses instead of making the new loans needed for the
economy. This consequence has already been seen in countries such as Japan and Thailand. In Japan, bank
lending fell some four percent, while the economy shrank 2.5%. That is largely due to the dicey state of banks.
Because they are carrying $600 billion of NPLs on their books, they are leery of lending to companies. See,
e.g., Ted Bardacke, Bad Loans Total 44% of All Lending by Thai Banks, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 3, 1999,
available at 1999 WL 3449778; Brian Bremner, Why Japan Is Stuck, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 12, 1999, available at 1999
WL 8226852.
39. See generally Renhong Wu, China's Economic Outlook, May 4, 1999, at http://www.chinaonline.com.
40. These complaints were dismissed by the PBOC. According to a PBOC survey, large- and mid-sized
companies with healthy profits were still getting needed loans, although credit controls were more stringent
and companies were being forced to look for needed capital through other channels. The survey found out
those enterprises were turned down largely because of their poor credit record. See China's Bank Loans on
Target, XINHuA ENGLISH NEWSWlaE, Apr. 5, 1999, available at 1999 WL 7931582.
41. In Hungary, for example, from 1987 to 1991, more than fifty-one percent of the outstanding bad debts
were concentrated in big banks. They inherited the bad debts of the big companies granted by the National
Bank of Hungary in their one-tier banking system. See, e.g., Sandor Ligeti, Problem Loans, in IEF RESEARCH
PAPERS IN BANKING AND FINANCE 93/13, 7 (1993).
42. See LARDY, supra note 20, at 220.
43. See, e.g., China Will Not Suffer a Financial Crisis: Official, XINHUA ENGLISH NEWSWIRE, Apr. 3, 1999,
available at 1999 WL 7931322.
44. See World Bank, China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century, CHINA 2020, Box 2.1 (1997).
For a detailed discussion about the evolution of the aims for China's economic reform, see Zongling Shen &
Jianbo Lou, The Contemporary Socialist Market Economy and the Law of the People's Republic of China,
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embraces far-reaching decentralization, a high degree of autonomy for the firm, and lib-
eralization of prices, with the predominance of state-ownership and the pervasive role of
state control. 41 In this sense, China's reform is no different than the socialist market reform
defined by Janos Kornai" and bears the exact problems he pointed out-the bureaucratic
coordination of the command economy is lifted without true market discipline being ap-
plied .4 In the rest of this section, the author will argue that it is the failure of market
discipline that has resulted in huge amounts of NPLs on the balance sheets of Chinese state
banks.
A. SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
In China's planned product economy, enforced until 1978, enterprises had few incentives
to increase profits and no penalties for not covering cost-an accommodating and pater-
nalistic state (in the shape of the Ministry of Finance and/or superior branch departments)
would always ensure that enterprises survived. Kornai describes enterprises in this situation
as enterprises operating under soft budget constraints.
1. The Concept of Soft Budget Constraints and Its Application
The concept of soft budget constraints was first introduced by Janos Kornai in 1980.48
Kornai defines budget constraints as a rational planning postulate with two important prop-
erties: first, the budget constraint refers to a behavioral characteristic of the decision maker
(he adjusts his expenditures to his financial resources); second, the budget constraint is a
constraint on ex ante variables and first of all on demand (it is based on expectations con-
cerning his future financial situation when the actual expenditure will occur). The "soft-
ening" of budget constraints appears when the strict relationship between expenditure and
earnings is relaxed, that is, when excess expenditure over earnings will be paid by some
other institution, typically by the state. A further condition of "softening" is that the
decision maker expects such external financial assistance with high probability and this
probability is firmly built into his behavior.
Kornai's conceptual framework for analyzing socialist economies is most widely used in
Address at the XV International Conference of Comparative Law Academy, Bristol (Aug. 1998); World Bank,
supra, Box 1.3; and Tianying Li, The Foundation of Socialist Market Economic Theory and a Significant Break-
through-in Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11 th Central Committee of
CPC [shehui zhuyi shichangjingii lilun de xingcheng he zhongda tupojinian zhongguo gongchandang di shiyjie sanzhong
quanhui ershi zbounian], 3 EcoN. RES. J. 3 (1999).
45. SeeJiang Zemin, Accelerate the Reform and Openness, Promote the Modernization Drive, Striving for
New Victories in the Way of the Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, Address at the 14th National Congress
of the CPC, in PEOPLE'S DAILY, Oct. 13, 1992, at 2.
46. Janos Kornai characterizes reform socialism with (1) the ruling role of the Communist party somewhat
mitigating the repression and allowing a degree of freedom for alternative views; (2) the pervasive role of state
control and the subordination of the economy to the bureaucracy; (3) the predominance of state-ownership;
(4) the development of market coordination as the main integrators of the economy; and (5) the development
of the private sector confined with some limits. SeeJANos KORNAI, HIGHWAY AND BYWAYs: STUDIES ON REFORM
AND POST-CoMMUNIST TRANSITION 59 (1995).
47. See id. at 44-45; and JANos KORNAI, THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM: THE POLITICAl. ECONOMY OF COMMUNISM
497-98 (1992).
48. SeeJANos KORNAI, ECONOMICS OF SHORTAGE (1981). For a more detailed explanation of the concept, see
Janos Kornai, The Soft Budget Constraint, 39 KYKLOS 1, 3 (1986).
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discussing the economies of Eastern Europe, 49 although it has been more recently applied
to China by Kornai himself 0 and other western scholars," as well as Chinese scholars."2
Their applications, however, mainly test the concept with China, instead of using the theory
to analyze some more specific issues.
2. Consequences of Soft Budget Constraints
The soft budget constraint on firms has many interrelated consequences. 3 As for its
impact on a firm's conduct, three consequences can be identified: weak price responsiveness,
low efficiency, and excess demand.14 The softness of budget constraints diminishes the firm's
sensitivity toward price fluctuation and, thereafter, invalidates the banks' efforts to curb
unsustainable borrowing by charging high interest rates. Weak price responsiveness can
lead to low efficiency of firms: allocation efficiency cannot be achieved when input-output
combinations do not adjust to price signals. Under soft budget constraints, there is not a
sufficiently strong stimulus to maximize firm profits. More seriously, when the external
circumstances are unfavorable, the firm is not forced to adjust to the changed situation;
instead, it is likely to seek external assistance, asking for compensation for unfavorable
external circumstances. A third consequence of the soft budget constraint syndrome may
show up in the formation of excess demand. Whatever goals the managers of the firm have
(maximizing short- or long-term profits, sales, growth of sales, size of the firm, discretion,
and power), these objectives, or any combination of them, will be associated with expansion.
This is whatJonas Kornai terms "investment hunger syndrome."
3. Sources of Soft Budget Constraints
The soft budget constraint has a number of sources. Kornai points to soft subsidies
granted by national or local government, soft taxation (under this, firms suffering difficulties
are granted tax concession or allowed to postpone payment of their taxes), soft credit, and
soft administrative prices.14 Among them, soft credits contribute directly to NPLs.
49. See, e.g., Janos Komai, The Hungarian Reform Process: Visions, Hopes and Reality, 24 J. EcoN. LITERATURE
4(1986).
50. See, e.g., Kornai, supra note 48; and JANOS KORNAI, VISION AND REALITY, MARKET AND STATE: CONTRA-
DICTiONS AND DILEMMAS REVISITED 35-36, 192-93 (1990).
51. See, e.g., Mario I. Blejer & Gyorgy Szapary, The Evolving Role of Tax Polity in China, 14J. COMP. EcoN.
452 (1990); Paul Bowles & Gordon White, Contradictions in China's Financial Reforms: The Relationship Between
Banks and Enterprises, 13 CAMBRIDOE J. ECON. 481 (1989); and Christine P.W. Wong, The Economics of Shortage
and Problems of Reform in Chinese Industry, 10J. COMP. ECON. 363 (1986).
52. See, e.g., SidongJiang et al., Financial Reform, the Two-Track System: Strengthen Credit Restraint, Open Up
a Capital Market Among the People, in CHINESE ECONOMIC STRUCTURAL REFORM RESEARCH INSTITUTE (BEUING):
RESEARCH REPORTS No. 25 (Nov. 29, 1985).
53. For a detailed discussion of all those consequences, seeJANos KORNAI, CONTRADICTIONS AND DILEMMAS:
STUDIES ON THE SOCIALIST ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 42-44 (1986).
54. Kornai, supra note 48.
55. A constant insatiable investment hunger is an apparent syndrome under the classical socialist system. See
KoRNA, supra note 46, at 189. Overinvestment was a chronic problem during China's classical socialist period.
For a detailed discussion of it, see Hsin Chang, The 1982-83 Over-investment Crisis in China, 24 ASIAN
SuRv. 1277 (1984). The investment hunger syndrome survived the economic reform started in 1978 with two
new characteristics. One is a rise in the proportion of a firm's profits that it need not hand over to the state
budget and can use to finance investment of its own. The other is a reduction within the entirety of the outside
resources for investment in subsidies from the state budget that need not be repaid and increase in bank credits
that have to be repaid with interest.
56. See, e.g., KORNAI, supra note 47, at 140-42, 489; KORNAI, supra note 48, ch. 13.
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B. MARKET DISCIPLINE-A MECHANISM TO CURB SOFT CREDIT
1. General Introduction-The Theoy of Market Discipline
Market discipline is by no means a new concept to the financial world. Whenever there
are doubts about the efficiency and effectiveness of financial regulation, people turn to
concepts such as market force, market place, or market discipline in the hope that the market
can solve problems better than state intervention. William McDonough, president of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Chairman of the Basle Committee, when talking
about the reform for the 1988 Basle Accord, insisted on the need for reliance on market
discipline and said that "[t]he new framework was supposed to include 'as great as possible
a reliance on market discipline, with emphasis on transparency and disclosure.' "s7
Timothy Lane developed the theory of market discipline by studying the experience of
federal unions, ranging from tight central control of borrowing by lower levels of govern-
ment to virtually complete reliance on market forces; evidences regarding sovereign debt;
the relationship between market discipline and financial regulation; and soft budget con-
straints in socialist countries." He discovered that in the diverse cases examined, the con-
ditions required for market discipline are essentially the same: openness and competitiveness
of capital markets; availability of information on the borrower's outstanding liabilities; no
expectation for bail-out; and the borrower's capability and willingness to respond to market
signals provided by interest rate spreads. Evidence suggests that although market discipline
is an important force, it is not always strong enough to prevent unsustainable borrowing
because of the failed conditions of market discipline, especially the "no-bailout" condition.
It is often difficult to make such a condition credible. Lane recommends reinforcing market
discipline by some kind of direct controls or rules, stressing the importance of implementing
measures to strengthen market discipline itself.
Jonas Kornai, who has done thorough studies on the post-socialist economy, uses the
term "financial discipline" synonymously with market discipline. He defines financial dis-
cipline as the enforcement of four simple rules: (i) buyers pay for the goods they buy,
(ii) debtors abide by the loan contract and pay back debt, (iii) taxpayers pay their taxes, and
(iv) enterprises cover their costs out of their revenues. Although these rules are self-evident
in a market economy, Kornai acknowledges they are far from obvious in a socialist command
economy-characterized with soft budget constraint. After analyzing Hungary's experi-
ences in introducing these new rules, he made two conclusions: (i) a range of prior condi-
tions must be satisfied before the financial discipline can be firmly imposed, and (ii) a long
period of time must pass before the actors in the economy believe that market discipline is
being imposed.59
2. Market Discipline as a Mechanism to Curb Unsustainable Borrowing and Its Conditions
Unsustainable borrowing, that is, borrowing without the means or even the intention of
repaying, directly leads to NPLs. Market discipline is one force that may limit such abuse
of financial markets: market discipline implies that lenders penalize excessive borrowing,
first, by requiring a higher interest rate spread and, ultimately, by excluding the borrower
57. Basle to Keep Partial Modeling, INT'L BANKER, Apr. 12, 1999, available at 1999 WL 5992038.
58. See generally TIMOTHY D. LANE, MARKET DISCIPLINE (IMF Working Paper WP/92/42, June 1992).
59. KORNAI, supra note 46, at 141-60.
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from the market.6° Nicolas Lardy expands the lender's discipline function to the time after
the funds are lent. Once funds are lent, the lender monitors the borrower to ensure that
the use of funds is consistent with the loan contract. Most importantly, they can force
borrowers who fail to amortize their loans on a timely basis either to restructure them in
order to survive or to exit.6' If market discipline works effectively, credit will be hardened
and hence unsustainable borrowing can be efficiently curbed.
Market discipline will not work for itself, however. As mentioned above, there are four
conditions for market discipline to work effectively. Failure of any of these conditions will
lead to the failure of market discipline.62
a. Open and Competitive Capital Markets
This is required so that unsustainable borrowing will face the borrower with increased
interest rates or exclusion from the market. In the case of financial institutions, if legal
restrictions that limit competition for deposits-such as geographic scope of activities, or
on the activities permitted to particular categories of institutions-give particular institu-
tions a degree of market power, this may reduce the market's ability to discriminate between
prudent and imprudent financial intermediaries, and thereby render market discipline in-
effective. In the case of SOEs in reforming socialist economies like China, if financial
institutions are directed by the authorities to lend to particular enterprises regardless of
their creditworthiness, financial discipline will be nullified.
b. Information
A second requirement for effective market discipline is to allow lenders to obtain relevant
information about the borrower's outstanding debts. Due to the imperfect accounting rules,
financial institutions can conceal their losses from both creditors and regulators. This se-
riously undermines the market discipline. The information problem has been studied ex-
tensively after the burst of the Asian financial crisis. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF), in a report about the Asian financial crisis, concluded that weakness in disclosure
practices in the Asian crisis countries allowed excessive risk-taking.63 The weaknesses iden-
tified by the IMF include:64 (1) High corporate leverage was hidden by related-party trans-
actions and off-balance sheet financing; (2) High-level foreign exchange risk exposure by
corporations and banks resulting from large, short-term borrowing in foreign currency was
not evident; (3) Disclosure of loan classification, loan loss provisioning, and accrual of
interest was weak. Although most banks disclosed the accounting policy for loan-loss pro-
visioning, they did not disclose in the balance sheet the aggregate amount of loans and
advances for which they had stopped accruing interest; (4) In Korea, the practice of cross-
guarantees made it hard to assess the solvency of the largest borrowers; (5) Consolidation
of accounts was generally absent; (6) Detailed information on sector concentration was
largely absent, even though all countries had large exposure limits in place; (7) Disclosure
regarding derivative financial instruments was weak; and (8) Contingent liabilities of the
60. LANE, supra note 58.
61. LARDY, supra note 20, at 59-60.
62. See Graham Bishop et al., 1992 AND BEYOND: MARKET DISCIPLINE CAN WORK IN THE EC MONETARY
UNION (1992); and Jacob A. Frenkel & Morris Goldstein, Monetary Policy in an Emerging European Economic
and Monetary Union, 38 IMF STAFF PAPERS 356 (June 1991).
63. See Tomis J.T. Balino et al., Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring Lessons from Asia, in 2000 IMF
OCCASIONAL PAPER 188 (1999).
64. See id. Box 2.
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parent of conglomerate, or of financial institutions, for guaranteeing loans (particularly
foreign currency loans) were generally not reported. Andrew Sheng, the chairman of the
Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission, summarized the information problem as
"'Bad accounting = bad information = poor decision-making = bad risk management
- financial crisis.' "65
In the case of SOEs in socialist economies, the need for timely information to assess
enterprises' creditworthiness is always frustrated by the unavailability of necessary infor-
mation and the incapability of bank loan officers to find and process the relevant infor-
mation.
c. No Bailout
For market discipline to be effective, it is necessary that there is no anticipation of a
bailout in the case of (actual or impending) default. This condition is the most crucial and
its failure is probably the most important reason for the failure of market discipline.
In formerly planned economies, even as reforms proceed, banks are often content to
continue lending to insolvent enterprises in the belief that the authorities will make good
on the loans. Even if authorities would like to promote efficiency by committing themselves
not to bail out insolvent enterprises, such a commitment may not be credible. Once a large
enterprise's failure is impending, the government's best response, in view of the possible
losses of output and employment, may be to bail out the enterprise. 66
d. Borrower's Response
Market discipline takes two forms: initially, the borrower faces a rising interest rate spread
and eventually access to further credit is denied. Because the second stage is often associated
with a financial crisis, it is not a normal form of market discipline. Thus, a condition for
the smooth operation of market discipline is that borrowers respond to the signals provided
by the market in time to avoid a crisis.
A rational agent, when faced with a higher interest rate, would respond by reduced
borrowing in order to get back onto a sustainable path. In fact, if a rational agent possessed
as much information as the lender did, it would not wait for a market signal: a rational
borrower would anticipate that further borrowing would lead to a higher interest rate
spread, and, taking that knowledge into account, would refrain from unsustainable borrow-
ing. Borrowers who believe that there is a high probability of insolvency, however, will not
respond to market signals or anticipate them: they have nothing to lose by borrowing, even
at a high interest rate.67 In other words, market discipline does not work through interest
rate spreads if borrowers are already near insolvency; it can only work by excluding insolvent
borrowers from the market.
65. ANDREW SHENG, THE FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: MACRO AND MICRO ISSUES IN STRENGTH-
ENING THE BANKING SYSTEM IN CHINA: ISSUES AND EXPERIENCE 154, 161-62 (BIS POLICY PAPERS No. 7,
Oct. 1999).
66. See generally Mark E. Schaffer, The Credible-Commitment Problem in the Center-Enterprise Relationship, 13
J. COMP. ECON. 359 (1989); see also DANIEL HARDY, SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS, FIRM COMMITMENTS, AND THE
SOCIAL SAFETY NET (IMF Working Paper WP/91/98, Oct. 1991).
67. This is the problem of adverse selection, which has been used as the basis for an explanation of credit
rationing in private credit markets. Lenders may not be able to identify these borrowers, and there is no limit
to how much a borrower who plans to be delinquent would like to borrow, so there is a need for credit to be
rationed. See Joseph Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 73 AM.
ECON. REV. 393 (1981). The restrictions on large exposure can be reasoned on this ground as well.
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C. FAILURE OF MARKET DISCIPLINE-THE ULTIMATE ROOT OF THE NPL PROBLEM
IN CHINA
Applying the theory of soft budget constraints and market discipline to China, if budget
constraint were hardened and market discipline were working effectively, state banks would
not lend to SOEs unless they are ensured that borrowers are willing to and capable of
repaying loan interests and principles. Hard budget constraints and market disciplines on
SOEs would prevent them from borrowing to finance loss-making productive activities that
are never expected to turn profitable. The efficient functioning of market discipline could
thus prevent the creation of NPLs, or at least reduce the amount of NPLs to an acceptable
level: defending the soundness and safety of the banking system. The huge amount of bad
assets with state banks, therefore, provides evidence that market discipline is not working
effectively in China, and soft budget constraints still apply to SOEs. The veracity of this
assumption will be tested in the next section.
IV. Causes of NPLs-Empirical Analyses
A. BANK-CENTRIC FINANCE AND STATE-BANK-DOMINATED FINANCIAL SYSTEM
1. Bank-Centric Finance in China
China is still in the stage of bank-centric finance,6 bank lending-often directed by
government policy-dominates enterprise finance, and bank deposits dominate individual
investment.
Various reasons can be attributed to the bank-centric finance in China.69 The most im-
portant reason is that bank-centric finance fits the need of the Chinese government to direct
savings from the personal sector into the financing of industrial development and infra-
structure, which can be instituted and controlled from above.70 The relatively small role of
capital markets is not purely a product of market forces; it is also a product of administrative
decree. The authorities feared that unrestrained capital market development would drain
resources from the state commercial banks, and use credit plans to set quotas on how much
equity and securitized debt can be issued in a given year.7'
a. Underdeveloped Capital Markets72
The Central Government restarted selling treasury and other types of government bonds
in 1981. SOEs, investment companies, and state-owned financial institutions were author-
68. For definitions and description of bank-centric finance and market-centric finance, see, e.g., Kevin L.
Mellyn & Matthew I. Saal, A Perspective on the Risk and Regulatory Implications ofMarket-Centric FinancialSystems,
at http://www.iif.com/pressrel/1998pr14.html.
69. For a detailed discussion about the reasons, see generally Statistics Department of the PBOC, An Analysis
of the Direct Finance of Chinese Enterprises, 9 CHINA FIN. (Beijing) 24 (1998) [hereinafter Analysis of the Direct
Finance].
70. China has long aimed at establishing a bank-centric financial system since the economic reform. See
generally Liu Hongru, Developments in the Reform of China's Banking and Financial System, 2 J. CHINESE L. 323
(1988).
71. See, e.g., World Bank, supra note 44, at 33. In 1997, for example, the quota for enterprise-convertible
bonds was RMB 4 billion. The quota assignment for stock issuance was removed in 2000. On March 16, 2000,
the State Council approved the Procedures of China Securities Regulatory Commission for Examining and
Approving Stock Issuance (zbongguo zbengiianhui gupiaofaxing hezhun chengxv), approved by the State Council
on March 16, 2000. The new procedures eliminated quota assignment and administrative recommendations.
72. For a brief description of the pre-1995 development of China's securities markets, see FRANCIS A. LEES
& K. THOMAs LAw, FOREIGN PARTICIPATION IN CHINA'S BANKING AND SECURITIES MARKET 59-88, 89-123
(1996).
WINTER 2000
1160 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
ized to sell bonds beginning in 1986. But markets for these debt instruments developed
extremely slowly. From 1987 to 1995, the value of all bond issues in a year had never
exceeded 20 percent of the total value of investment by state-owned units." Enterprise
bond issues have been especially small.14 Between 1995 and 1997, the annual value of en-
terprise bond issues accounted for less than 3 percent of the total enterprise finance (see
Table 2).
The stock markets were created in the 1980s when provincial legislatures began to ex-
periment with company regulations, and locally chartered companies began to issue shares
to sell to the public.75 Two stock exchanges-Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock
Exchange-opened in 1990 and 1991, respectively. In addition to firms listed on foreign
exchanges, by the end of 1999, there were 949 companies listed in domestic stock exchanges,
and forty-six companies listed abroad, raising capital altogether equivalent to approximately
RMB 400 billion.76 In 1998, the issuance of stock accounted for 15 percent of the country's
total amount of financing raised annually.77
At the end of 1999, there were 1,209 securities on the stock exchanges, with 1,032
A-shares, 108 B-shares, 45 funds, and 26 bonds;" the market capitalization was RMB 2,650
billion, or equivalent to 32 percent of China's GDP. 9 In G-10 countries, the market cap-
italization of their stock markets now represents well over 100 percent of their GDP. s° It
is estimated by the World Bank that even if capital markets in China grow at more than
twice the rate of projected GDP growth (in real terms), by 2020 the value of stocks and
bonds relative to China's economy would only approach that in India's capital market today
(70 percent of GDP)."'
b. The Domination of Bank Lending in Enterprise Finance
In contrast to the underdeveloped capital markets is the dominating role of bank lending
in enterprise finance. Bank lending accounted for about 90 percent of finance in China in
1998.12 With regards to enterprise finance, the proportion of bank borrowings accounted
for over 80 percent from 1995 to 1997 (see Table 2).
c. The Domination of Bank Deposits and Savings in Household Finance Assets
The bank-centric finance in China is also reflected in the structure of household finance
assets. The household financial assets in China, although diversified in recent years, are still
dominated with bank deposits and savings. In 1997, bank deposits and savings accounted
73. See World Bank, supra note 44, fig. 3.8.
74. Enterprises in China have been allowed to issue bonds since the late 1980s.
75. See Anthony Neoh, China's Domestic Capital Markets in the New Millenium (Aug. 21, 2000), at http://
www.chinaonline.com/commentary-analysis/economics/currenmews/secure/c00082143.asp.
76. According to the CSRC Chairman Zhou Zhengqing, Securities Market Is to Play More Important Role in China's
Economy [zhongguo zhengquanhui zhushi zhou zhengqing cheng zhengquan shichangjiangfahui genjian zhongyao de
zhouyong], PEOPLE'S DAILY (Overseas Ed.), Jan. 8, 2000, at 5 [hereinafter CSRC Chairman].
77. See Some Investors Still Bullish on China's Listed Companies, at http://www.chinaonline.com/topstories/
todayb2_99011818.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2000) [hereinafter Some Investors Still Bullish].
78. See Qin Pan, A New Stage for China's Securities Markets [zhongguo zbengquan shichang maishangxin taifiel,
PEOPLE'S DAILY (Overseas Ed.), Jan. 22, 2000, at 5.
79. CSRC Chairman, supra note 76.
80. Neoh, supra note 75.
81. World Bank, supra note 44.
82. See, e.g., Xuejun Jiang & Yan Liu, China's Financial Structures, 6 CHINA FIN. (Beijing) 43 (1998).
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for more than 80 percent of all household financial assets, securities only accounted for
approximately 10 percent, and cash and other assets less than 10 percent. 3
d. High-Leverage Ratio in Enterprises and High-Level of NPLs-
A Direct Consequence of Bank-Centric Finance
Bank-centric finance often leads to high-leverage ratios in enterprises, especially when it
is combined with oversaving. One logical consequence of oversaving is that companies could
access cheap capital from the banks for a long time. This often leads to imprudent invest-
ment and expansion on the basis of debts. The debt-asset ratio is currently 65 percent and
71 percent respectively for state enterprises and collective enterprises, 84 which has meant
that banks and enterprises are so intertwined that industrial collapse would pull down in-
dividual banks or even the entire banking system.
Moreover, a bank-centric finance system easily creates NPLs within its banking sector
because people left most of their financial resources in the banks to earn a risk-free return.
Banks have to lend the money out to make profits. When easy money is flooding to com-
panies and projects such as real estate development, a bubble will be created in the property
sector and the stock market, as well as huge overcapacity in the manufacturing sector. Later,
when the economy slows down, the bubble bursts, companies are left with large amounts
of unsold goods, and banks end up with massive amounts of NPLs.s5 This argument is
supported by international experiences that the ratio of NPLs to GDP in bank-centric
finance economies are usually higher than that in other countries suffering from a financial
crisis s .
2. The Domination of State Commercial Banks
a. The Big Four-Dominated Financial System
The bank-centric finance in China is closely connected to a bank-dominated financial
system in China. China has a financial system that is heavily dominated by banks. Their
share of financial intermediation is almost nine-tenths, a ratio exceeding that found in
almost all other Asian countries. 7 Further, because virtually all banks in China are state
owned, the bank domination in China is reflected in state-bank domination.
Although a variety of institutions are populating China's financial sector and there is now
a nucleus of potential competition between commercial banks, state commercial banks,
especially the big four, are still dominating the banking sector (see Table 3). The profits of
the big four accounted for 50 percent of the profits in China's banking system in 1998.8
83. Analysis of the Direct Finance, supra note 69.
84. Wu, supra note 39. Even the listed companies have much higher debt-asset ratios. The 1997 average
debt-asset ratio of Chinese listed industrial companies was 47.7%. Some Investors Still Bullish, supra note 77.
85. See, e.g., Yonghao Pu, How to Save China from Oversaving?, June 28, 1999, at http://www.
chinaonline.com.
86. See World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2000 Report, 73 (Dec. 1999). That ratio has been twenty-seven
percent in South Korea, thirty percent in Malaysia, sixty percent in Thailand, and twenty-five percent in
Indonesia. In contrast, NPLs in other major emerging market crises (Chile in the early 1980s and Mexico in
1995) were less than twenty percent of GDP. In the Scandinavian banking crises, NPLs amounted to approx-
imately five percent of the GDP. East Asia's heavy reliance on bank-based financial systems and the high debt-
equity ratios of corporations have made the economic distress especially acute. Id.
87. See LAROY, supra note 20, at 16.
88. See, e.g., S & P Downgrades Hit China's Big Banks Wh'en They Can Least Afford It, at http://www.
chinaoline.com.
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Table 3
China's Financial Institutions (Excluding Securities and Insurance
Companies) and Their Asset Amounts by the End of 1998*
Percentage of the
Amount of Assets Financial Assets
(trillion yuan) in Aggregate
Financial Assets in the Aggregate 15.25 100
"Big Four" State Commercial Banks 9.5 62.30
Three Policy Banks** 1.38 9.05
Fourteen Small Commercial Banks*** 1.68 11
Foreign Banks 0.28 1.8
Rural and Urban Credit Cooperatives 1.65 10.8
Trust and Investment Companies* 0.54 3.5
Note: * The PBOC is not included.
** They are; State Development Bank, Export and Import Bank of China, and Agricultural Development
Bank of China.
*** They include three state-held banks (BOCOM, China Everbright Bank, and CITIC Industrial Bank),
three public-held banks (China Merchants Bank, Huaxia Bank, and China Minsheng Banking Corporation),
and a number of regional commercial banks such as Shenzhen Development Bank, Hainan Development Bank,
Fujian Industrial Bank, Guangdong Development Bank, and Pudong Development Bank. Most of them were
established in the 1990s.
**** China is now planning to restructure its ITIC industry. See, e.g., Lana Wong, Beijing Details Clean-Up
of Troubled ITIC Sector, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 17, 1999, at 1.
Source: Profile-Cbina Banking Services, AsIA PULSE, Apr. 1999, available at 1999 WL 5095417.
They hold 68 percent of the nation's deposits, 77 percent of all loans, 75 percent of the
country's total assets, and employ 66 percent of those working in the banking sector.5 9 At
year-end 1996, the assets of China's largest bank, the ICBC, was RMB 3.6 trillion, an
amount equivalent to just over half of China's GDP in the same year. The assets of the
CCB, the second largest, were RMB 2.1 trillion, 30 percent of GDP. Even by the standards
of Asia's bank-dominated financial systems, these two banks accounted for an unusually
high share of credit creation. Malaysia's biggest lender, Malayan Banking, had assets of less
than 40 percent of GDP in 1997. The ratio for the biggest Thai bank, Bangkok Bank, was
25 percent. In contrast, the biggest bank in the United States, Chase Manhattan, controls
assets equal to only 4 percent of GDP.9° Thus, China appears to be an extreme example of
the Asian pattern where a few banks loom very large on the financial landscape and com-
petition is very limited.91
89. A Look at Bank Reform in Cbina, supra note 23.
90. See LARDY, supra note 20, 165-66.
91. In all Asian crisis countries, commercial banks dominate the financial system. At the end of 1996, total
assets of the Indonesian financial system were equivalent to about ninety percent of GDP, with commercial
banks holding eighty-four percent of total assets. In South Korea, the total assets of the system were close to
300% of GDP, with commercial banks alone accounting for fifty-two percent of the total assets, while spe-
cialized and development banks accounted for seventeen percent. In Malaysia, total assets of the system were
equivalent to 300% of GDP, with commercial banks accounting for seventy percent of the total assets of the
banking system (comprising the commercial banks, finance companies, and merchant banks). In Thailand, total
assets of the system amounted to the equivalent of 190% of GDP, with commercial banks alone accounting
for sixty-four percent of total assets. See Balino, supra note 63, at 19.
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b. State Commercial Bank Domination: Captive Finance Markets
As we have mentioned before, one condition of market discipline is that capital markets
must be open and competitive. This is required so that unsustainable borrowing will face
the borrower with increased interest rates. A bank-dominated financial system is a captive
market where households and enterprises are left with very few choices but to deposit or
save their money with banks, no matter how high or low the interest rates.92 In a state bank-
dominated financial system, it is hard to require that state commercial banks operate as
genuine commercial banks because they do not face substantial competition.
B. SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS ON SOEs IN THE FORM OF SOFT CREDIT
As mentioned before, soft credit is one of the four main sources of soft budget constraints.
The other three are state subsidies, soft tax, and administrative prices. All four forms of
soft budget constraints existed in China before the economic reform, and to some extent
exist today. With the development of economic reform, however, soft credits are gradually
taking the place of other forms of soft budget constraints.
The concept of soft credit denotes the whole life cycle of a loan. In the author's view,
lending is only the beginning of the life cycle of a loan. A complete loan cycle includes the
enforcement of the remainder of the loan contract as well. Without rigorous enforcement
of the loan contract, even a loan based on proper commercial standards will become sour.
Under soft credit, banks lend without carefully assessing their borrowers' creditworthiness.
After a loan is granted, the banks are passive in enforcing the loan contract, unreliable debt
service is tolerated, and postponement and rescheduling are in order. In China, soft credit
has been reflected in policy loans and banks' passivity in enforcing loan contracts.
1. Policy Loans
The negative effects of policy loans have been widely recognized. Government-directed
loans have been blamed for the financial crises in Korea and Indonesia.93 It is frequently argued
that China's NPL problem results from years of bad lending practices, and is exacerbated by
political influences on bank lending or actual policy lending to inefficient, overleveraged
SOEs.94 The World Bank, for example, has noted with concern that "state banks are not yet
completely free to lend according to commercial criteria," as "about a third of their investment
lending is allocated to projects selected by the State Planning Commission, and the rest is
92. Anecdotal evidence shows that countries with bank-dominated financial systems, such as Japan and
China, are able to sustain high household savings rates, even when real interest rates paid on savings are not
very attractive. However, the absence of significant competition from capital markets in such systems typically
has led to inefficiency in the allocation of funds and a low rate of return on bank capital. LARDY, supra note
20, at 10-11.
93. See, e.g., ToMAs J.T. BALINO & ANGEL UBIDE, THE KOREAN FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 1997-A STRATEGY OF
FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORM (IMF Working Paper WP/99/28, Mar. 1999); EDUARDO BORENZTEIN &JONG-WHA
LEE, CREDIT ALLOCATION AND FINANCIAL CRISIS IN KOREA (IMF Working Paper WP/99/20, Feb. 1999);
Craid P. Ehrilich & Jay K. Lee, Governance of Korea's Chaebols: Role in Crisis, Coming Changes, E. AsIAN EXECUTIVE
REP. 9 (Mar. 15, 1998); Michael M. Phillips, One by One: A Look at How the Global Finance Crisis Began, WALL.
ST.J. EUR., Apr. 29, 1999, at 12.
94. See, e.g., LARDY, supra note 20, at 91-92; Dan Atldnson, China Plans Bank Clean-up as Yuan Slides, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 6, 1999, at 17; and China: ADB: Chinese Banks Need 5-Year Reprieve Before Liberali-
zation, Apr. 22, 1999, available at 1999 WL 5618989.
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subject to considerable informal government influence, particularly in the provinces."95 And
"as a result the creditworthiness of borrowers and the commercial viability of projects are often
not important considerations in lending decisions."96
Lardy defines policy loans in China as loans extended at the behest of the governmental
authorities at the central and local level rather than as a result of normal commercial bank
decision making.97 There are two forms of policy loans in China: policy loans for devel-
opment purposes and policy loans to subsidize loss-making SOEs.9
a. Policy Loans for Development Purposes
Policy loans for development purposes are often referred to as relending in China. The
central bank lends to financial institutions, primarily the big four. These funds are ear-
marked to finance specific projects identified by the State Planning Commission.9 These
loans are clearly policy loans because they are both directed and financed by the central
government.1°°
Policy loans for development purposes have developed with the decentralization of fi-
nancial resources in China. Under the old system of enterprise finance before the economic
reform-known as "uniform collection and unified expenditure," enterprises received state
budgetary allocations in accordance with the annual economic plan authorized by the State
Council. SOEs returned almost all their profits to the MOF and received investment funds
plus a minimum amount of quote working capital in the form of grants from the state
budget.' 0' The PBOC, the mono-bank in China before the reform, 1°2 played a very limited
role. The PBOC only provided SOEs with credit to finance above-quote working capital.'0°
Soft budgets to SOEs then seldom took the form of soft credit from banks.
The economic reform initiated in 1978, however, has been changing the picture com-
pletely. Accompanying the decentralization of decision-making power through the re-
forms,- ° an increased proportion of the national financial resources are held by the decen-
tralized units, such as households, enterprises, and local governments. Government savings
mobilized though its budget declined during the reform period and their share in total
savings dropped from almost 46 percent in 1978 to less than five percent in 1991. The
95. World Bank, supra note 44, at 31.
96. Id.
97. LARDY, supra note 20, at 83.
98. This division has been used before by other authors. See, e.g., Yingyi Qian, Financial System Reform in
China: Lessons from Japan's Main Bank System, in THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM: ITS RELEVANCE FOR DE-
VELOPING AND TRANSFORMING ECONOMIES (Masahiko Aoki & Patrick Huge eds., 1994).
99. Now the State Development and Planning Commission.
100. See LARDY, surpa note 20, at 84.
101. See Bowles, supra note 51.
102. Prior to the reforms, financial resources in China were highly centralized. The mobilization and allo-
cation of financial resources was done mainly through the state budget in conjunction with the state plan.
Household savings accounted for only three percent whereas the state budget accounted for forty-six percent
of total national savings on the eve of the reforms in 1978. Since the government was the main saver and
investor, financial intermediaries were neither necessary nor allowed. Hence, financial markets were closed,
financial instruments were prohibited, and all financial institutions had been either confiscated or nationalized
and were merged with the PBOC. See, e.g., Y.C. JAo, FINANCIAL REFORM IN CHINA AND HONG KONG 1987-
1988: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW (Paper presented to the Inaugural International Conference on Asian Pacific
Financial Markets, Nov. 16-18, 1989).
103. See, e.g., Luc De Wulf, Financial Reform in China, FIN. & DEv., Dec. 1985, at 19.
104. For a general discussion of the decentralization in China's industrial system, see, e.g., chapters 3 and 4
in JOSEPH C.H. CtII, CHINA: TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY (1997).
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share of savings by decentralized units, however, soared dramatically-by 1991 the share
of households in total national savings reached 46 percent. Thus, decentralization of finan-
cial resources led to a greater separation of the saver from the investor. As a result, there
arose a need for financial intermediaries. 15 After the 1979-84 banking system reconstruc-
tion, a two-tier banking system evolved in China: with the PBOC as the first-tier bank and
four specialized state banks as the second tier.0 6
With more and more financial resources being held by decentralized units, the share of
central government revenues of GDP has been decreasing annually. 17 In 1998, the central
government revenues were only 12 percent of GDP-well below the developing country
average of approximately 32 percent, making it one of the lowest levels in the world.s The
decline in revenue, combined with the government's desire to keep the budget deficit mod-
est, has brought a similar decline in government expenditures as a share of GDP. Investment
suffered the most, falling from 16 percent of GDP in 1978 to less than 3 percent in 1995.109
As a result, the expansion of the economy relies heavily on the banking system. Starting in
1983, budget financing of working capital for SOEs was drastically curtailed, and in late
1984 the authorities announced that the budget would no longer provide financing for
fixed-asset investment." 0 In 1995, bank loans accounted for 39 percent of government-
controlled investment.'
Granting policy loans for development purposes has been legalized as the obligation of
state commercial banks since the very beginning of their establishment as specialized state
banks. The 1986 Interim Regulations on Bank Administration provide that state specialized
banks should lend to enterprises according to state policies and plans." 2
To free state commercial banks from policy loans for development purpose, three policy
banks have been established since January 1994: the State Development Bank (SDB), whose
general responsibility is for infrastructure lending;" 3 the Agricultural Development Bank
(ADB), whose responsibility is for funding agricultural procurement and agricultural infra-
structure;" 4 and China Export-Import Bank, whose responsibility is to handle export-
105. See generally World Bank, World Development Report, 28-29 (1989).
106. De Wulf, supra note 103. For the status of China's financial system at the end of 1985, see figure 1 in
Xiaochuan Zhou & Li Zhu, China's Banking System: Current Status, Perspective on Reform, 11 J. Comp. EcoN.
399 (1987).
107. Between 1978 and 1995, budgetary revenues tumbled from thirty-five percent of GDP to eleven per-
cent. See World Bank, supra note 44, at 24.
108. More importantly, sixty percent of RMB 548.3 billion of total central government revenues in 1998
came not from tax collection but from the issuance of debt. Of the debt raised, 70.9% went on to servicing
and financing the redemption of other debts. This seriously impairs the central government's ability to pursue
a macro-economic policy as well as a fiscal stimulus policy. See, e.g., James Kynge, China: Poor Revenues Hit
Growth Hopes, FIN. TiMEs (London), Apr. 6, 1999.
109. See, e.g., World Bank, supra note 44, fig. 3.1.
110. See generally State Council, Circular of the State Council Approving and Promulgating the Report of the
People's Bank of China on PBOC's Unified-Management of State-Operated Enterprises' Working Capital (June 25,
1983); and Ministry of Finance, Interim Provisions Converting411 State Budgetary Capital Construction Investment
from Appropriations to Loans (Dec. 14, 1984).
111. See World Bank, supra note 44, fig. 3.2.
112. See State Council, Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Bank Administration, art. 14 (Jan.
7, 1986) [hereinafter Interim Regulations on Bank Administration].
113. See Circular of the State Council on Establishing State Development Bank No. 22 (1994).
114. See Circular of the State Council on Establishing China Agricultural Development Bank No. 2 5 (1994).
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import financing for key sectors."' It was expected that all government-directed investments
outside the budget would be financed though the policy banks. The establishment of the
four policy banks has to some extent released the big four banks of their policy-lending
obligation, as reflected in changes in the magnitude of central bank loans to the big four.
Central bank lending to the big four grew from RMB 268.2 billion in 1985 to over RMB
960 billion by 1993 and then fell to RMB 680 billion at year-end 1995 as policy lending
began to be channeled through newly created policy banks in 1994.116 The policy banks,
however, generally lack secure funding sources. For example, most of the SDB's funding
has come from low-interest bonds placed with state banks by PBOC fiat, while the ADB
relies on PBOC relending for 90 percent of its needs." 7 Another weakness of policy banks
is their lack of branches."- They have to rely in varying degrees on designated institutional
proxies. Furthermore, policy banks, because of their mandates to lend to state projects, and
for the implementation of state policies, are accumulating NPLs themselves. The ADB, for
example, had accumulated RMB 214 billion NPLs from its establishment to November
1999.'" 9
These institutional weaknesses with young policy banks indicate that it may take a while
before they have the resources to shoulder all policy lending. As a result, state commercial
banks are still required to conduct their loan business in accordance with the need for the
development of the national economy and social progress as well as under the guidance of
the state industrial policy. 120
b. Policy Loans to Subsidize Loss-Making Enterprises
The situation of policy loans to subsidize loss-making enterprises is more complicated
than policy loans for development purposes. China's SOEs, while acquiring increased au-
tonomy over their operations since 1980,121 are increasingly under pressures from compe-
tition created by trade liberalization and the proliferation of nonstate enterprises, and con-
sequently suffer huge losses every year.'22 Their rate of return on assets (measured by pre-tax
115. The Export-Import Bank of China was formally established on April 26, 1994, and began operating
on July 1, 1994. The bank's financial business is subject to the direction and supervision of the MOF, the
MOFTEC, and the PBOC. See TIMOTHY HAOSEN WAN, DEVELOPMENT OF BANsKING LAW IN THE GREAT CHINA
ARM: PRC AND TAIWAN 181-82 (1999).
116. See LARDY, supra note 20, at 85.
117. See generally William D. Holmes, China's Financial Reflrms in the GlobalMarket, 28 LAW & PoL'v INT'L
Bus. 715 (1997).
118. It was reported that twenty regional branches of the former China Investment Bank, a state-run com-
mercial bank that funds major infrastructure projects across China, have been transferred to the SDB, adding
to the SDB's own thirty branches. See, e.g., China's State Development Bank Adds 20 New Commercial Branches,
Mar. 18, 1999, at http://www.chinaonline.com.
119. See, e.g., China: China's WTO Deal Heralds Radical Banking Reform, REUTERS ENGLISH NEwS SERVICE,
Nov. 16, 1999. The ADB funds state grain purchases from farmers at above-market prices. It was estimated
that the amount would rise dramatically as cheaper and better foreign agricultural imports flooded the market.
Id.
120. See Commercial Banking Law of the People's Republic of China, decree 47, art. 34 (May 10, 1995)
(PRC).
121. For a detailed discussion of the SOEs' increasing autonomy through the economic reform, see C L,
supra note 104, ch. 4.
122. Compared to non-state sector enterprises, SOEs have lagged in output, employment, and productivity
growth. Their return on assets is estimated at just 6.0%, compared with 8.4% in collectives, and 9.9% in joint
venturea.Their share of loss-makers was twenty-six percent in 1992 and increased to fifty percent in 1996. See
World Bank, supra note 44, at 28.
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profits divided by the sum of the depreciated value of fixed assets plus working capital) has
been declining during the economic reform, which averaged twenty-four to 25 percent in
the early years of reform, and has declined continuously since 1985 while staying at only 6
percent in 1997.123 As a result, the SOEs' dependence on public subsidies began to in-
crease. 2 4 The decentralized financial resources, however, made the government unable and
unwilling to subsidize these enterprises by budget. -2 Thus, the state banking system became
the SOEs' main source of financial support. 26
Some of the subsidizing policy loans are actually subsidies to enterprises that are suffering
losses because of government policies and the cost of their social security benefits.'27 After
the decentralization of finance resources, the task of subsidizing those enterprises shifted
from the government budget to banks. Banks are required to lend to subsidize loss-making
enterprises.'28
To contract the scope of subsidies, at the 14th Session of the 8th NPC in March 1996,
the government announced its intention to concentrate on the reform and development of
1,000 large SOEs and state-owned enterprise groups that would form the core of China's
modern enterprise system. At the same time, the government would loosen controls on the
operations of China's roughly 90,000 small industrial SOEs 29 The central government
also determined that continued policy loans, tax relief, additional credit, and sales support
would be used to support these 1,000 core enterprises and enterprise groups, while the rest
of the SOEs would be left for restructuring, mergers, leasing, and sale to nonstate enter-
prises or bankruptcy.3 ° Consequently, the state commercial banks' lending mission was
narrowed to a small population of eligible SOEs by the adoption of the main bank system.
Adopting the Japanese model, each borrower is paired with a main bank lender-actually
a designated bank branch-with which it keeps its basic account and from which it receives
all of its loans (unless the main bank is unable to meet its demand). Three hundred core
large- and medium-sized SOEs were paired with main banks as the first step to adopting
the main bank system.' As a result, 80 percent of new loans went to these 300 SOEs in
the first half of 1996.132
In addition to policy loans subsidizing enterprises suffering losses because of government
policy, there are also loans made under informal government intervention. Banks are forced
123. See, e.g., LARDY, supra note 22, at 17-18.
124. Since the late 1980s, direct fiscal subsidies and indirect subsidies (policy loans) combined to at least ten
percent or more of GDP every year. See LARDY, supra note 20, at 4.
125. For example, budgetary subsidies fell from 7.5% of GDP in 1992 to 2.3% in 1994. See The Chinese
Economy: Fighting Inflation, Deepening Reforms, in WORLD BANK CouNrRv SURVEY 17 (1996).
126. Despite recent attempts to reform, China's banks are still the dispensers of disguised subsidies, in the
form of loans, to unprofitable SOEs. In 1994, for example, implicit financial subsidies in the form of low-
interest-rate loans and unpaid principal and interest came to 1.7% of GDP. Id.
127. For example, in 1994, a survey of 156 SOEs shows that the budgetary and financial subsidies received
costs equal to enterprises arising from government price policies, social securities benefits, and wages for
redundant workers. Id.
128. In 1994, for example, the PBOC issued an urgent circular requiring state commercial banks to lend to
"hopeless," loss-making SOEs, so as to maintain the life of those SOEs' employees and the stability of the
society. See PBOC, Urgent Circular on Making Working Capital Loans to SOEs No. 34 (1994).
129. LARDY, supra note 20; and World Bank, supra note 44, at 29-30.
130. See, e.g., Sheryl Miller, Institutional Impediments to the Enforcement of China's Bankruptcy Laws, 8 INT'L
LEGAL PERSP. 187 (1996).
131. This system is set out in PBOC, The Provisional Measures for Main Bank Management (June 29, 1996).
132. Holmes, supra note 117.
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to make subsidizing loans to SOEs outside the 1,000 core enterprises. Enterprises outside
the 1,000 core enterprises or enterprise groups are mainly SOEs subject to local govern-
ments. Local governments at various levels, especially provincial governments, fearing a
large layoff from the failure of loss-making enterprises, have pressured state banks to keep
lending to loss-making enterprises. And they were well positioned to make interventions
because the PBOC and the big four have thousands of regional and local branch offices
that were under dual administration by headquarters and the regional or local govern-
ments.133 Under such an administrative structure, even if the commercial bank law granted
banking institutions autonomy to make lending decisions and prohibit any individual or
entity from forcing the bank to make lending or provide a guarantee, 34 their full autonomy
cannot be guaranteed. 135 According to Moody, in the first half of 1999, 89 percent of state
bank lending was to state-sector companies in spite of their poor performance.1 6
To curb the intervention from local government, the PBOC has recently reformed its
institutional structure. It has abolished its branches at provincial and municipal levels, under
which banks were vulnerable to local government intervention, and established trans-
provincial branches in nine major regions, along the line of the U.S. Federal Reserve Sys-
tem. 37 It is expected that this institutional change can increase central bank power in pur-
suing monetary policies, increase its independence in supervising financial institutions,
punish people who break the law, and improve its efficiency. The state commercial banks
have been reforming their institutional structure and concentrated lending discretion.'
Moreover, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council
have established a high-level, joint party government Financial Working Committee to
oversee China's financial sector.'39 It was reported-4° that the establishment of the Working
133. China's central bank was an immense institution with branches in every provincial level administrative
unit and offices in all the larger cities as well as most counties before the 1998 structural reshuffle. By mid-
1993, the provincial branches of the PBOC responded primarily to provincial level political leaders rather than
central bank headquarters in Beijing. This was not surprising since the control of appointments of the top
officials in each provincial branch of the central bank was largely in the hands of provincial party officials rather
than in the hands of the central bank headquarters in Beijing. In turn, the provincial branches of the four
specialized banks, to a lesser degree than other banks, were responsive primarily to the policies emanating from
the provincial branches of the central bank rather than their own head offices in Beijing. This structure max-
imized the possibility that loan decisions within each province would be responsive to local political pressure
and even corruption. See LARDY, supra note 20, at 90-91.
134. Interim Regulations on Bank Administration, supra note 112; Commercial Banking Law, art. 41; and
General Lending Rules, art. 22 (Aug. 1, 1996) (provides lender's right) [hereinafter General Lending Rules].
135. This is indicated in one signed article by an official with the headquarters of CCB published in Zhongguo
Jingrong (China Finance), a journal published monthly by the PBOC, where the author suggests that regional
and local branches should avoid and resist making policy loans imposed by local governments with flexible
strategy and tactics and try to win over their understanding and support. See Bo Song, Proposals on the Commercial
Bank's NPL Workout, 1 CHINA FIN. (Beijing) 23 (1998).
136. See, e.g., James Kynge, Beijing: China Bank Reform "Yet to Tackle All Faults," FIN. TiMes (London), Aug.
18, 1999.
137. See, e.g., Financial System Reform to Move into New Stages, XINHUA NEws AGENCy, Apr. 2, 1999, available
at 1999 WL 7302553. For the evolution of PBOC's regional branch system, see Evolution of China's Central
Bank Regional Branch System, Jan. 27, 1999, at http://www.chinaonline.com.
138. See, e.g., CCB Is Enjoying a Rapid Development and Undertaking a Strategic Reform, 8 CHINA FIN. (Beijing)
9 (1998); The Reform of SOEs and the ICBC, 1 CHINA FIN. (Beijing) 8 (1998); and ABC Pressing Forward in
China's Reform and Opening up, 8 CHINA FIN. (Beijing) 4 (1998).
139. "The Committee is headed by Wen Jiabao, Politburo member and Vice Premier." China Establishes
High-Level Banking Oversight Committee, June 23, 1998, at http://www.chinaonlinecom.
140. Id.
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Committee was intended (1) to make China's banking system independent of regional and
local political leadership and (2) to end widespread corruption among banking officials.
Whether these institutional reforms can insulate state commercial banks from local gov-
ernment intervention, however, remains to be tested.'14 Given the complexity of the prob-
lem, it might be safe to conclude that policy loans to subsidize loss-making SOEs will not
disappear in the near future. Dai Xianglong, the PBOC governor, announced at the World
Economic Forum in Beijing in April 1999 that the big four would end policy loans to bail
out government businesses within two years. 142 This might be a realistic commitment.
2. Creditor Passivity of Banks
Soft credit does not only mean that banks lend to SOEs without careful credit analysis,
but also denotes that creditors involuntarily or voluntarily tolerate their debtors' default.'14
This kind of phenomenon was termed "creditor passivity of banks" by David Begg and
Richard Portes in their 1993 paper on enterprise debt and financial restructuring in Central
and Eastern Europe.- 4
a. Creditor Passivity of Banks in China
The creditor passivity of banks is pervasive in China. When enterprise debtors fail to pay
loan principal and interest on time, instead of enforcing the loan contract against defaulting
debtors, foreclosing on the collateral, filing a bankruptcy case as the last resort, or seeking
debt-restructuring arrangements, banks often choose to simply reschedule or roll over the
debtors' loans. 45 Although the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law'1 6 has been in effect since No-
vember 1, 1988, three months after the law on SOEs147 became effective, only a few enter-
prises went bankrupt. 148 Furthermore, among all the bankruptcy cases, only a handful of
them were initiated by banks. For example, in 1994, among all the bankruptcy cases filed
with the court, only 1.7 percent of them were initiated by banks, 1.6 percent in 1995,149
141. It is noted by Davin Mackenzie, the International Finance Corporation Chief Representative in China,
"that now local governments no long decide who should be appointed as senior officials of the banks' local
branches; [and] as a result.., the banks are reporting less administrative intervention in their lendingactivities."
China's Banking Reform Yields Results: IFC Officia4 XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, May 14, 1999, available at 1999 WL
7303805.
142. Rowan Callick, China Draws Near to WTO Membership, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Apr. 28, 1999, at 15.
143. See KORNAI, supra note 46, at 118, 123; and KORNAI, supra note 47, at 132.
144. See generally David Begg & Richard Portes, Enterprise Debt and Financial Restructuring in Central and
Eastern Europe, 37 EUR. EcoN. REv. 396 (1993).
145. See, e.g., Wuyi Wang, Analyzing Factors Influencing the Bankruptcies of China's State-Owned Enterprises,
JINGJI YANJIU (Beijing),June 20, 1994, at 41.
146. Law of the People's Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy (Trial Implementation) (Nov. 1,
1998) [hereinafter Enterprise Bankruptcy Law]. This law applies only to SOEs. For an English translation, see
Douglas G. Boshkoff & Yongxin Song, China's New Bankruptcy Law: A Translation and Brief Introduction, 61
Am. BANKR. L.J. 359 (1987).
147. The Law of the People's Republic of China on State-Owned Industrial Enterprises (Aug. 1, 1988).
148. According to unofficial statistics, the Chinese court accepted more than 11,600 bankruptcy cases from
the effective date of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law to mid-1997. Among them, the majority were non-SOE
enterprises. Furthermore, of those bankrupt SOEs, the majority are small enterprises with fewer than 1,000
employees. Miller, supra note 130.
149. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR ASSET RESTRUCTURING, supra note 1, at 209-10. In 1995, only forty-
seven of 2,385 bankruptcies were initiated by banks. SeeJane Macartney, China Sharply Accelerates Bankruptcies
in 1996, REUTERS NEws SERVICE, Jan. 28, 1997.
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and 1.15 percent in 1996.150 As an adjunct to banks' reluctance in directing an enterprise
into bankruptcy, the banks also become unwilling and sometimes strongly adverse partici-
pants in reorganization or compromise proposals.'' Making matters worse, banks are often
required by the government to subsidize enterprise reorganization. For example, to en-
courage acquisitions of weak industrial SOEs by healthy SOEs, banks are required to ex-
empt or suspend the interest repayment of the loans to acquired SOEs.1S2
b. Causes of Creditor Passivity of Banks in China
Janet Mitchell discusses causes of "creditor's passivity" using Hungarian experiences. 53
First, banks may not initiate bankruptcy proceedings because the expected value of the
debtor's assets is less than the costs of enforcing bankruptcy, or because there is an option
value in waiting. In the former case, there is no incentive for new lending, whereas the
latter may justify rescheduling debt; a sufficiently favorable outcome may work wonders for
existing, non-performing debt. Second, taking action against debtors may signal the extent
of the bank's NPLs. In China, a run on state commercial banks is unlikely because of
implicit government guarantee, but the bank may nevertheless be reluctant to signal its
problems to regulatory authorities and the public. Third, there may be free rider problems
when there are multiple creditors. If each bank foresees that a government bailout will
become necessary because other creditors take no action, such an expectation may become
self-fulfilling.
In China, in addition to these normal causes, several factors can be identified as causes
of the passivity of banks in collecting loans. There are disincentive factors within and outside
the banking system. The disincentive factors outside the banking system include the reluc-
tance of the government to allow insolvent SOEs to file bankruptcy, weakness in the court
system, the lack of an adequate social welfare system, regionalism, the short history of
bankruptcy law in PRC, and so on."14 A PBOC survey found problems such as bankruptcy
practices not being standardized, eroding of creditors' interests, and certain policies and
regulations failing to match bankruptcy practice."l 5 In the rest of this section, the author
will mainly discuss the problems with China's bankruptcy and banking legislation.
c. The Disincentives: Factors Within China's Banking Law
While the bank soft credits are now the main source of soft budget constraints on SOEs, -
the general budget constraints on China's state commercial banks remain soft as well. De-
spite the provisions of the Commercial Bank Law,5 6 state commercial banks in China are
not operating independently and hence cannot assume their civil responsibilities indepen-
150. In 1996, only seventy-two of 6,232 bankruptcies were initiated by banks. Macarmey, supra note 149.
151. See, e.g., Ronald Winston Harmer, Insolvency Law and Reform in the People's Republic of China, 64 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 2563 (1996).
152. See PBOC, SETC, and MOF, Circular on How to Deal with Bank Principles and Interests of Loans
to Weak Industrial SOEs in 18 Pilot Cities When They Are Acquired by Healthy SOEs (May 4, 1995).
153. Janet Mitchell, Creditor Passivity and Bankruptcy: Implications for Economic Reform, in CAPITAL MARKETS
AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION (Colin Mayer & Xavier Vives eds., 1993).
154. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see generally Miller, supra note 130; Harmer, supra note 151;
and Mark E. Monfort, Reform of the State-Owned Enterprises and the Bankruptcy Law in the People's Republic of
China, 22 OxLA. CITY U.L. Rev. 1067 (1997).
155. See Central Bank Cites Impact of Bankruptcies, CHINA NEws AGENCY, Dec. 18, 1995.
156. Article 4 of the Commercial Banking Law provides that a commercial bank shall operate indepen-
dently-free from interference by any department and individual-assume civil responsibilities independently
with its entire assets as a body corporate-take up responsibility for all risks it may encounter and for its own
profits and losses it may bear.
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dently.'5 1 First, as previously mentioned, a significant proportion of their lending remains
policy loans or loans conducted under informal government intervention; therefore, they
have to extend loans to SOEs regardless of their creditworthiness. This, together with the
various administrative controls on commercial banks, makes it difficult to hold banks re-
sponsible for their own profits and losses. Second, because of their state ownership and the
"too big to fail" logic, state commercial banks can always expect government bailout.
In addition to soft budget constraints, inadequate loan classification and provisioning
rules also create disincentives for Chinese banks to act positively against their delinquent
borrowers. In China, the main indices in the assessment of a bank's business volume are
the balances of deposits and loans, interest receipts, and, closely related to the interest
income, the bank's profits. Outstanding loans after liquidation when the borrower and its
guarantor go bankrupt would be classified as irrecoverable loans' and thus affect the banks'
official evaluation. It is therefore understandable that bank managers, especially managers
of state commercial banks, would like to keep their borrowers afloat.
Moreover, unlike banks in most developed countries, which usually maintain adequate
reserves for bad debts, Chinese banks have maintained a very low ratio of NPL provisions
to total assets. The big four only started to provide for irrecoverable loans in 1988 at fixed
percentages to their outstanding loans at the beginning of the year and the percentages
ceiled the reserves.159 In 1992, the ceiling was increased to 1 percent of the total outstanding
loans at the beginning of the year,160 and further increased to 1 percent of the year-end
outstanding loans from 1998 on.' Extra provisions are not tax deductible.
Making matters worse, Chinese banks do not have enough autonomy to write off NPLs.
Before 1988, the big four were not allowed to write off any bad loans without specific
approval from the State Council. After the implementation of the Enterprise Bankruptcy
Law in 1988, a handful of firms were liquidated each year, but the banks still had little
autonomy to write off loans they had extended to liquidated enterprises. Banks must get
approval from local PBOC branches, provincial PBOC branches, or even the State
Council.'62 The result appears to be that banks are required to keep on their books many
loans to liquidated borrowers. 163
- 157. One banking law drafter observed it would take "a period of time for the banking institutions to meet
all the new banking laws' requirements." James Harding, China Passes New Banking Law, FIN. TIMES (London),
May 12, 1995.
158. See Interim Provisions on State Specialized Banks' Irrecoverable Loan Reserves, art. 3 (Jan. 1, 1988)
(PRC) [hereinafter Irrecoverable Loan Reserves].
159. The percentages required were quite low: 0.1% for working capital loans to industrial production
enterprises, commercial enterprises, and construction enterprises; 0.2% for loans to the agricultural sector,
urban and township collective enterprises, and private enterprises and individual proprietors; 0.15% for export
& import loans; 0.2% for foreign exchange loans, loans for fixed assets, and loans for updating technology. No
reserves were allowed to provide for loans substituting budgetary grants, special-purpose loans trusted by local
governments and authorities in charge of the enterprise, loans secured with collateral, and interfinancial insti-
tution loans. Irrecoverable Loan Reserves, arts. 5-7.
160. The ceiling for 1993 was set at 0.5%. Banks were required to increase their reserves 0.1% annually
from the previous year until their reserves reached one percent of their total outstanding loans at the beginning
of the year. See Ministry of Finance, Circular Revising Interim Provisions on State Specialized Banks' Irrecov-
erable Loan Reserves, art. 2 (Jan. 1, 1992).
162. See WORLD BANK, CHINA: FINANCIAL SECTOR POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 94-95 (1990).
161. See Circular of the Ministry of Finance on the Non-Accrual Loans and Loan Loss Provisions, CHENGSHIJINRONG
BAn (July 21, 1998).
163. In 1994, for example, branches of ICBC, CCB, ABC, BOC, and BOCOM applied together to write
off RMB 474 million of irrecoverable loans; only RMB 4.172 million got the approval for the write-off.
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d. The Problem with the Bankruptcy Proceedings
China's current Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, adopted in 1986, is a very brief statute, with
only forty-three articles. The bankruptcy proceedings under this law impede creditors from
initiating a bankruptcy case against their debtor enterprises.
Under the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, SOEs may be placed in bankruptcy proceedings
when they have "suffered serious losses and cannot pay [their] debts because of poor man-
agement."'4 This qualifies the right of creditors to force involuntary proceedings by requiring
proof that the businesses' losses are due to poor operation and management. Theoretically,
businesses whose losses could not be anticipated and prevented are outside the bankruptcy
net, even though they are deeply in debt. Creditors are also prohibited from filing bankruptcy
cases against public utilities and enterprises of major concern to the national economy and
the general welfare of the public whose debts are to be repaid by government subsidies or
through other arrangements with appropriate governmental departments.os Although the
burden of proof on creditors was mitigated to some extent by the People's Supreme Court
Opinions of 1991,166 given the difficulties in identifying the financial state of an enterprise due
to underdeveloped accounting and disclosure practices in China, 61 it is still not an easy job
for a creditor to make the decision to initiate a bankruptcy case.
Even if the creditor succeeds in building up evidence and filing a bankruptcy case against
its debtor, the bankruptcy proceeding is still subject to various government interventions. 68
164. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, art. 3.
165. Id.
166. Supreme People's Court, Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Issues Concerning the Implementation
of the Law of Bankruptcy for Enterprises of the People's Republic of China (Nov. 7, 1991) [hereinafter Bankruptcy
Law Opinions]. By then it had been recognized that the skeleton nature of the Bankruptcy Law required some
considerable detail regarding practice and procedure. The Opinions sought to provide such details. With regard
to article 3 of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, the Opinions stated that an inability to discharge matured
liabilities meant that the time for discharge or payment of such debt (or debts) had expired, a creditor had
demanded payment, and the debtor was obviously deficient in liquidity. Bankruptcy Law Opinions, art. 8.
Article 8 of the Opinions also provided that a debtor should be deemed incapable of discharging matured debts
if it ceased repaying debts continuously. These provisions, together with the provisions that a creditor need
only prove its claims against the debtor and the debtor's incapability of repaying the debt due when it files
bankruptcy against the debtor (article 2 of the Opinions), have obviously mitigated the creditor's burden of
proof in filing a bankruptcy case against its debtor.
167. All insolvency laws relate to the financial position of an enterprise; the early identification of the
financial situation of an enterprise is vital to the implementation of modem insolvency techniques of reorga-
nization or reconstruction. Also, the maintenance of full and proper accounts avoids time and costs in a liqui-
dation procedure. Only with the assistance of a modem accounting system may the financial position of an
enterprise be fairly ascertained. Because of the long period of command economy, when accountingmechanisms
were geared to provide basic cost and production information, it was not until mid-1993 that China began to
adopt recognized and accepted international accounting techniques and standards. The accounting and disclo-
sure practices remain poor in China. In addition to the poor accounting and disclosure practices, there are
other obstacles in determining a SOE's real financial situation, including soft budget constraints, government
intervention, and a great number of social burdens on SOEs. These factors make it difficult to properly assess
SOE performance. See Monfort, supra note 154.
168. The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law is filled with references to discretionary actions by government au-
thorities. Government authorities are involved in the composition and reorganization of the insolvent enterprise
(under article 17 of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, if the bankruptcy procedure is instituted by creditors of
the insolvent enterprise, the government authority in charge of the insolvent enterprise can apply for the
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The enterprise bankruptcy will almost inevitably involve such government agencies as the
auditing authority, the administration for industry and commerce, the revenue authority,
the price-control authority, the civil administration department, the land administration,
the labor and personnel department, the social insurance authority, and others. Actually, in
most circumstances, the court will have to seek the collaboration from the relevant gov-
ernment authorities in dealing with the insolvent enterprise. Sometimes, the court cannot
even declare the bankruptcy of an insolvent enterprise without the collaboration of all the
relevant government authorities.'
The extensive government involvement makes the bankruptcy case unattractive to banks.
In addition to the usual difficulties associated with multiple decision makers, it also results,
in many cases, in a lengthy decision-making process, while an insolvency law that is proac-
tive cannot be expected to provide benefits unless the process is permitted to operate quickly
and efficiently, before the financial difficulties become acute and critical.
e. The Pro-employee Asset Distribution
According to article 37 of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, the assets of the bankruptcy
estate will not go to the unsecured creditor before salaries and labor insurance benefits
owed by the debtor are given to its workers and staff, and then the taxation obligation of
the debtor is satisfied. 70 A circular issued by the State Council in 1994 reiterates the bias
in favor of employees. According to that circular, the first priority in a case of enterprise
bankruptcy is to "resettle the employees in order to maintain order and stability in the
society."'' The circular provides that proceeds from the sale of land use rights (usually the
most valuable property of the insolvent enterprise) shall first be used to resettle the em-
ployees of the enterprise before it can be included in the bankruptcy estate for distribu-
tion; 172 if the proceeds from the sale of the land use right cannot satisfy the resettlement
reorganization of the insolvent enterprise no later than three months after the court's acceptance of the cred-
itors' application. Article 20 of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law authorizes the government authority in charge
of the insolvent enterprise to manage the reorganization of the enterprise after the composition agreement has
been reached between the insolvent enterprise and its creditors), the liquidation of the bankrupt enterprise (in
accordance with article 24 of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, the People's Court should appoint a liquidation
commission formed by the government authority in charge of the bankrupt enterprise, the government fiscal
organ, and professionals within fifteen days after the declaration of the bankruptcy), the settlement of the
redundant employees of the bankrupt enterprise and their welfare before reemployment (article 4 of the En-
terprise Bankruptcy Law provides that the government should settle down the redundant employees of
the bankrupt enterprise through various means, arrange for their reemployment, and ensure their life before
reemployment), and the investigation of the liability for the bankruptcy of the enterprise (article 42 of the
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law authorizes this to the government's supervisory authority and auditing authority).
169. See Wang Zheng, Going Bankrupt in Accordance witb the Law-Practices in Sbenyang, PeOPLE's DAILY,
Nov. 18, 1996. The dominant role of government in enterprise bankruptcy is clearly evidenced by the bank-
ruptcy of the Achen Sugar Mill. The plant in Heilongjiang province was established in 1905 and used to be
one of the largest sugar mills in China. Because of poor management and heavy debt burdens, the enterprise
stopped production in 1993. At the end of 1997, the enterprise had assets worth only RMB 280 billion, while
its debts (principal and interest) accumulated to RMB 700 billion. The company, however, was only able to
apply for bankruptcy in June 1998 after the approval of the relevant government authorities. See Chen Kaixing,
The Bankruptcy ofAchen Sugar Mill Goes to Its Last Stage [Achen Tangchang Pochan An Jingru Zhongiiejieduan],
PEOPLE's DAILY (Overseas Ed.), Nov. 12, 1998, at 1.
170. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, art. 37.
171. State Council, Circular on the Trial of Bankruptcy of State-Owned Enterprises in Several Pilot Cities,
art. 1 (Oct. 25, 1994) [hereinafter 1994 Circular].
172. Id. art. 2.
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requirements, other assets in the bankruptcy estate should be used for resettlement pur-
poses. 7 Likewise, the housing, schools, nurseries, hospitals, and other welfare facilities of
the bankrupt enterprise will no longer be the property of the bankrupt enterprise, but rather
will be administrated by the relevant government department, with their employees to be
taken in or resettled by the unit that takes over the particular facility.74 In 1997, the State
Council promulgated the Supplementary Notice on Issues Concerning the Trial Imple-
mentation in Several Cities of State-Owned Enterprise Bankruptcy and Merger and Re-
employment of Staff and Workers. 17 It creates fundamental changes in the rights of cred-
itors (both secured and unsecured) provided by the Civil Procedure Law, 176 the Security
Law, '7 and the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, 178 stripping them of their expectancyin a search
for funds to pay for the resettlement and reemployment of employees of bankrupt SOEs.
Creditors of bankrupt enterprises covered by the 1997 Notice-state-owned industrial en-
terprises in what are now the 111 cities 7 9 in the State Council's Capital Structure Opti-
mization Program for enterprises-are now to be paid only out of assets remaining after
the costs of resettlement have been met.180 Like the 1994 Circular, the 1997 Notice provides
that the cost of the resettlement of employees shall be paid for first by revenues from the
disposition of land use rights.' The 1997 Notice, however, goes further to specifically state
where land use rights that have been encumbered with security interests are also to be used
for funding resettlement costs before any of the income from their dispositions is used to
pay off secured creditors."s2 These provisions have seriously reduced the amount of bank-
ruptcy estate available for creditors. As a result, banks become the largest loser in enterprise
bankruptcy. In the Achen Sugar Mill bankruptcy case, for example, after liquidation, the
bankrupt enterprise had assets equal to RMB 120 million. All of its assets were used to
compensate its 4,500 workers, the cost of which was estimated at RMB 130 million. All
loan principal and interest, which equaled to RMB 700 million, was written off.I"3
3. Policy Loans and Creditor Passivity of Banks: Bailout Expectation and Borrower's
Irresponsiveness to Market Signals
As mentioned in Section III, no bailout expectation and borrowers' responsiveness to
market signals are prerequisites to market discipline. These two conditions are hampered
in China by policy loans and banks' passivity in enforcing loan contracts.
173. Id. art. 3.
174. Id.
175. State Council, The Supplementary Notice on Issues Concerning the Trial Implementation in Several
Cities of State-Owned Enterprise Bankruptcy and Merger and Re-employment of Staff and Workers (Mar. 2,
1997) [hereinafter 1997 Notice].
176. Civil Procedure Law, art. 203-04.
177. Security Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 33 (June 30, 1995) [hereinafter Security Law].
178. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, art. 32.
179. The relevant cities are listed in an appendix to the 1997 Notice and include Beijing, Changchun,
Changsha, Chengdu, Chongqing, Dalian, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Haikou, HarbinJilin, Nanjing, Ningbo, Qing-
dao, Shanghai, Shenyang, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Wuhan, Xiamen, and Wuxi.
180. See Donald C. Clark, State Council Notice Nullifies Statutory Rights of Creditors, 19 E. AsIAN ExEctrTVE
REP. 9, 9 (Apr. 15, 1997).
181. 1997 Notice, supra note 175, art. 5.
182. Id.
183. Kaixing, supra note 169.
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a. Failure of Market Discipline Due to Policy Loans
As a kind of soft budget constraint to SOEs, policy loans result in SOEs' irresponsiveness
to market signals8 4 and lack of dynamic capacity. To make matters worse, because banks
are subject to government mandate and intervention in their lending activities, the need
for the development of the micro-credit analysis structure in the banking industry has been
delayed and masked-resulting in weak internal control systems, especially risk-control
systems within state commercial banks. All these lead to the failure of market discipline in
preventing unsustainable borrowing in China and consequently result in the accumulation
of NPLs on state commercial banks' books.
b. Budget Constraints Cannot Be Hardened without Positive Bank Creditors
The passive attitude of bank creditors towards SOEs has further softened the enterprise
budget constraints. Despite various efforts to harden budget constraint on SOEs, without
pushing insolvent SOEs into bankruptcy, however, budget constraints cannot be really hard-
ened and there will be no real financial discipline.'85 To make matters worse, as a result of
passivity, banks, especially state banks in China, become more and more exposed to loss-
making SOEs. This means that they are more vulnerable to the collapse of enterprise, and
make them more passive in enforcing their credit.
C. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ON STATE COMMERCIAL BANKS:
CREDIT PLAN AND INTEREST RATE CONTROL
I. Administrative Controls on State Commercial Banks as Instruments
to Implement Monetary Policy
China's bank-centric finance has determined that the bank must play an important role
in accumulating and distributing funds. This, together with the central bank's inability to
use indirect instruments to implement monetary policy, result in administrative controls on
184. According to a survey in 1992, enterprises' demands for bank loans were not very responsive to changes
in interest rates. CHAI supra note 104, table 5.3. The inelastic demand was partly due to the fact that enterprises
were not yet fully responsible for their profits and losses. It was also due to the practice whereby, until very
recently, enterprises were allowed to deduct from their pre-tax profits both the cost of interest and the repay-
ment of the principal of their loans. This practice lowered the cost to enterprises of borrowing and reduced
the interest rate elasticity of demand for bank loans. Id. at 129.
185. Efforts in China and other formerly planned countries, at least in the very beginning of their reform,
were mainly made to increase the profit incentives within state-owned enterprises. Hardness of the budget
constraint, however, is not a synonym for profit maximizing. Profit maximizing refers to the internal goal
setting of the decision maker in the firm; the softness-hardness of the budget constraint refers to the external
tolerance limits to losses. A profit-maximizing firm, if it is in the red, will try to cut its losses. A hard-budget
constraint means that even if the firm tries hard to cut its losses, the environment will not tolerate a protracted
deficit. The emphasis is on punishment. In this sense, making a state-owned enterprise an independent legal
person accounting for its own profits and losses does not mean that the budget constraint has been really
hardened. Only when the persistent loss is a matter of life and death can we say that there is a hard budget
constraint on state-owned enterprises in China. In other words, the fact that managers and workers of a state-
owned firm are interested in increasing profits does not in itself determine their behavior. Only if profit
incentives are combined with a hard budget constraint will efforts be directed towards the line of real actions.
186. "As Ziyang Zhao, China's former premier minister, pointed out in his report of the Seventh Five Year
Plan, the function of banks in macroeconomic management should be significantly reinforced." Hongru, supra
note 70, at 332.
In his report to the thirteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Zhao, Ziyang
again emphasized that we should intensify the reform of China's monetary system, strengthen the
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commercial banks such as credit plans, interest rate controls, etc., 8 6 although these direct
instruments have not always proven very effective."87
The overreliance on direct monetary instruments evolved from the pre-reform period.
From 1953 to 1978, the state controlled the supply of credit and cash through a credit and
cash plan.l"' The credit plan was to provide working capital for industry and commerce,
while the cash plan was designed to control demand and to facilitate transactions in con-
sumer goods markets. 8 9 The PBOC followed cash and credit plans from the State Planning
Commission, and its branches provided financial resources to enterprises according to the
plan.
In 1978, the PBOC was separated from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and granted
ministerial rank. 19 Five years later, in 1983, the State Council granted the PBOC the
authority of a central bank and the PBOC subsequently transferred its commercial opera-
tions to four specialized banks.' 91 The decisions authorized the PBOC to take responsibility
for making and implementing monetary policy via credit plans and interest rate control,
among other means. 92 The PBOC therefore continued to operate through the familiar and
proven administrative controls of the centrally planned economy, setting limits on prices
(interest rates) and quantities (credit) to pursue its dual objectives of directing credit while
maintaining macro-economic control. 91 The PBOC's responsibilities of formulating and
implementing a credit plan and controlling deposit and loan interest rates were confirmed
in the 1986 Interim Regulations on Bank Administration.' 94
Under the general theme of establishing a "socialist market economy with Chinese char-
acteristics," the State Council issued the Resolution on Financial Reform in 1993,191 calling
for more reliance on indirect monetary policy instruments. The Resolution, however, re-
tained the credit plan as one of the main monetary policy instruments. 96 Following the
Resolution, the 1995 Central Banking Law' 97 provided the PBOC with market-oriented
mechanisms, such as deposit reserve requirements, fixed base interest rates, rediscounting
windows, central bank's credit to commercial banks, and open market operation to imple-
status of banks and their role in the system of macro-economic control, and exercise proper control
over the volume of credit funds supplied in accordance with sound policy relating to currency circu-
lation.
Id.
187. For example, broad money maintained its rapid expansion in 1995 on the strength of rising foreign
reserves and higher-than-expected growth in domestic credit, as state commercial banks found new ways to
circumvent the credit plan. WORLD BA, K COUNTRY SURVEY, supra note 125.
188. Before 1953, cash management was the centerpiece of monetary policy. See generally Dai Genyou, A
Review of PBOC's Monetary and Credit Polity, 12 CHINA FIN. (Beijing) 27 (1999).
189. See, e.g., Fernando Montes-Negret, Cbina's Credit Plan: An Overview, II OXFORD REV. EcON. POL'Y 25
(1995).
190. See Yi GANG, MONEY, BANKING, AND FiNANctmL MARKETS IN CHINA 27 (1994).
191. See State Council, Decisions of the State Council on the PBOC's Exclusive Role as Central Bank (Sept.
17, 1983) [hereinafter 1983 Decisions].
192. Id. art. 1.
193. Montes-Negret, supra note 189.
194. Interim Regulations on Bank Administration, supra note 112, art. 5.
195. State Council, Resolution on Financial Reform No. 91 (1993).
196. Id. § 1.
197. Law of the People's Republic of China on The People's Bank of China, art. 22 (Mar. 18, 1995) [here-
inafter Central Banking Law].
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ment monetary policy. Credit plans are not even listed as a specific monetary policy tool.
The PBOC, however, is not completely prohibited from using direct instruments to im-
plement monetary policy. Article 22 of the Central Banking Law provides that the PBOC,
in addition to the listed indirect instruments, can apply other monetary policy instruments
defined by the State Council. Actually, the credit plan continued its application after im-
plementation of the Central Banking Law.19 Besides, the central bank is still controlling
commercial banks' deposit and lending interest rates. 99
2. Credit Plan
a. General Introduction
The financial system in China had implemented the "credit plan" format by 1998-the
central bank regulated supply and allocation of credit through an annual credit plan.2° The
credit plan governed each bank's credit volume directly (in the aggregate, by different types
of lending, and sometimes by different sectors, subsectors, and even individual borrowers)
and translated the government's investment plans into reality.20'
The PBOC implemented the credit plan by imposing individual credit ceilings on spe-
cialized banks, and, later on, other commercial banks and nonbank financial institutions.
After formulating an annual credit plan, °20 the PBOC allocated credit ceilings to each state
bank's head office and to the PBOC branches in Shanghai and Shenzhen. In turn, the banks
allocated credit ceilings to their branches, with the exception of the branches in Shanghai
and Shenzhen, which received their credit ceilings from the PBOC local branch. The al-
location enabled the PBOC to derive ceilings for credit by region and by branch. These
ceilings were afterwards monitored by the local PBOC branch and were binding on the
overall operations of each bank and on their respective branch office. Swapping of credit
ceilings by branches whose loan demands were below the ceiling was not permitted. 03
Separate credit ceilings were set for different categories of bank credits. There were three
categories of bank loans: working capital credits (up to one year), technical renovation or
transformation credits (one to five years), and fixed capital construction loans (five to ten
years). Each maturity category was further broken down into activities, subsectors, and
major projects.2°4 Some flexibility was allowed: the specialized banks could reallocate their
"quota" from fixed asset lending to working capital loans, for example, but could not do
the reverse.
Credit plans have expanded application in an attempt to counter credit plan leakage.
Credit plans originally did not apply to nonbank financial institutions. In 1988, there were
great leakages from the credit plan, primarily through a rapid expansion of loans by nonbank
financial intermediaries. °0 As a result, inflation began to accelerate in 1988. The PBOC
198. Financial System Reform to Move into New Stages, supra note 136.
199. Central Banking Law, art. 5.
200. See, e.g., Joseph C.H. Chai, Domestic Money and Banking Reform in China, H.K. EcoN. PAPERS No. 14,
37 (1981).
201. WORLD BANK COUNTRY SURVEY, supra note 125, at 28.
202. For a detailed description of the process to formulate an annual credit plan, see WORLD BANK, supra
note 162, at 37-38; and Montes-Negret, supra note 189.
203. WORLD BANK, supra note 162, at 38.
204. Working capital loans, for example, are subcategorized as loans for the construction industry, industry
and commerce, technological development, local suppliers of equipment and inputs, special purposes, housing,
bridges, and capital construction reserve fund. Montes-Negret, supra note 189.
205. See LARDY, supra note 20, at 137.
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had to institute a broader credit plan beginning in March 1989.06 Under the credit plan in
the broader sense, all lending institutions, including credit cooperatives, trust and invest-
ment companies, and other nonbank financial intermediaries, were subject to credit ceil-
ings. 07
b. The Relaxation of Credit Plan
The economic reform in China has been observing the gradual relaxation of credit plans.
The traditional distinction between budget funds for financing enterprise fixed capital and
quota working capital, and bank credits for financing enterprise above-quota working cap-
ital was abandoned shortly after the initiation of the economic reform. Credits were in-
creasingly used to finance not only enterprise above-quota working capital but also quota
working capital and fixed capital requirements. 0s
From the mid-1980s, efforts were made to eliminate overall direct credit controls on
bank lending. For many years before 1985, banks submitted deposits to their headquarters,
received targets for loan making, and requested funds when they needed them109 This strict
management of the credit fund guaranteed the full implementation of the credit plan. Since
1985, the central bank began to adopt a method of dividing funds among specialized banks
and linking the amount of loans made by them to their deposits. The central bank was no
longer the only supplier of funds to specialized banks, which could borrow in financial
markets as well.2 10 As a result, though credit ceilings continued to be assigned to specialized
banks in accordance with the annual credit plan,2"' they were virtually no longer manda-
tory.2 Although the direct credit control was reintroduced in the late 1980s as inflationary
pressures mounted, the state commercial banks already possessed some autonomy in ex-
tending working capital loans, which accounted for 60 percent of the credit plan.21
A new round of financial reform started in 1993.214 The establishment of the three policy
banks and the adoption of the Central Banking Law and Commercial Banking Law in-
creased the autonomy of state commercial banks in lending decisions. Although the credit
plan was strictly enforced in 1994 and 1995, state commercial banks were granted increasing
autonomy in making investment-lending decisions within their individual credit ceilings
and were gaining some independence to pursue commercial objectives.
In 1994, the PBOC issued new prudential ratios in pilot form to guide the operations of
206. WORLD BANK, supra note 162, at 32.
207. Id. at 31.
208. See generally State Council, Circular of the State Council Approving the Report of the People's Bank
of China on PBOC's Mono-Management of State-Operated Enterprises' Working Capital (June 25, 1983);
and State Council, Report of the PBOC Concerning the Division of Business Scope in Fixed Asset Loans
Among Specialized Banks (May 13, 1984).
209. 1983 Decisions, supra note 191, art. 3. This article confirmed the system.
210. See, e.g., Gengyou Dai, A Review of PBOC's Monetary and Credit Policy, 12 CHINA FIN. (Beijing) 27
(1999).
211. Interim Regulations on Bank Administration, supra note 112, art. 35.
212. See generally WORLD BANK, CHINA: FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (1988).
213. The banks' freedom to allocate investment loans, however, was still circumscribed by a detailed lending
program drawn up by the State Planning Commission in consultation with the central bank, the MOF, and
the SETC. WORLD BANK CoUNTRY SURVEY, supra note 125, at 27.
214. In November 1993, the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth National Congress of the CCP set the future
course of financial sector development in China. See generally Decisions on Issues Concerning the Establishment of
the Socialist Market Economy System, XINHUA MONTHLY (Beijing), Nov. 1993, at 6.
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banks and nonbank financial institutions,21 requiring banks to keep their loan-deposit ratio
below 75 percent. '16 The new ratios were introduced to complement the credit plan. Credit
ceilings, however, still applied to banks whose lending volume exceeded the prescribed loan-
deposit ratio and to banks that did not have stable deposit resources." 7 The 1995 Com-
mercial Banking Law legitimized asset-liability management ratios."' In 1997, the appli-
cation of the credit plan was limited to the big four and the three policy banks. 1 9 On
December 24, 1997, the PBOC issued a Circular announcing the abolition of the ceiling
control on state commercial banks' loan sizes on January 1, 1998.220
c. Negative Effects of the Credit Plan
Under the credit plan, banks were actually facing a captive market, where they had no
choice but to lend to designated borrowers. For example, under the credit ceilings set in
the early 1990s for the largest specialized bank, the ICBC, about a third of lending went
to mandatory loans for key economic sectors, another third went to fixed-asset loans, and
another 10 percent was committed to specific projects of local governments. Thus, less than
20 percent of the bank's lending was decided autonomously. The achievement of investment
targets by the government has come at the cost of deteriorating loan portfolios in the banks.
Although the credit planning system was removed, the negative influences of this system
will remain with China's banking system for a long time.
Under the credit planning system, banks acted largely as passive channels, allocating
credit to priority sectors, subsectors, and projects selected by national and local govern-
ments. This resulted in weak internal controls, especially risk-management ability. Credit
plans seriously weakened the banks' awareness and effective control of credit risks. As pas-
sive financial agencies of the government, they did not need to manage their risks.22 The
lack of risk-management ability was evident in the sharp reduction in new loans in the first
quarter of 1998. When the credit ceilings on banks were removed in 1998, banks were
forced to cut their lending because they could not evaluate the risk of some projects prop-
erly.222
215. See Circular of the PBOC Concerning the Asset-Liability Management of Commercial Banks [zhongguo renmin
yinhangguanyu dui sbangyeyinbangshixing zichanffuzhai bili guanli de tongzbil (Feb. 15, 1994) [hereinafterAsset-
Liability Management Circular].
216. See generally id., appendix; and Montes-Negret, supra note 189, box 2.
217. Asset-Liability Management Circular, supra note 215, art. 6.
218. Commercial Banking Law, art. 39.
219. See Editorial Comment, A Major Reform to Macro Financial Regulation and Control [jingrong hongguang
tiaokong de zhongdagaige], PEOPLE'S DAILY, Dec. 26, 1997. The three policy banks are still subject to credit
ceiling control. See PBOC, Circular on Improving the Loan Size Management for State Commercial Banks
[zhongguo renming yinhang guanyu gaijing guoyou shangye yinhang daikuan guimo guili de tongzhil (Dec.
24, 1997) (hereinafter Loan Size Management Circular].
220. Loan Size Management Circular, supra note 219.
221. This happened in South Korea as well. In South Korea, beginning in the early 1980s, government
involvement in bank lending decisions was gradually reduced, but banks developed few skills in credit analysis
or risk management and lending decisions were still largely based on the availability of collateral rather than
on an assessment of risk and future repayment capacity. Balino, supra note 63, at 20.
222. See, e.g., A Survey on the Loan Eretending Behavior of Chinese Commercial Banks, 9 CHINA FIN. (Beijing)
27(1998).
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3. Interest Rate Control
a. The Development of Interest Rate Control
Interest rate control has been a dominant feature of China's financial system. Before the
economic reform, bank interest rates in China remained at low levels with very few brackets
and were always fixed for long periods of time.22
Since reform began, however, interest rate policy has gone through adjustments that have
enabled interest rates to function as a lever in regulating the supply and demand for funds. 22 4
Interest rates continued to be set administratively by the PBOC, subject, however, to the
approval of the State Council. The 1986 Interim Regulations on Bank Administration pro-
vide, except for interbank lending interest rates,22 the interest rates should be set by PBOC
headquarters.226 In December 1990, the PBOC promulgated Interim Provisions on Interest
Rate Administration, providing procedures for the PBOC to fix and administrate RMB
interest rates. 2 ' The 1995 Commercial Banking Law, which provides that a commercial
bank shall operate and assume civil responsibilities independently,22 confirms that the com-
mercial banks shall fix their interest rates for deposits and loans pursuant to the ceiling and
floor interest rates defined by the PBOC.229 On March 2, 1999, the PBOC issued its new
Provisions on RMB Interest Rate Administration.230 These Provisions grant financial in-
stitutions more freedom in deciding interest rates; the deposit and lending rates, however,
are still fixed by the PBOC.231
b. The Negative Effects of Interest Rate Control
Among all administrative restrictions, interest rate control does the greatest harm to the
functioning of market discipline. With interest rates being set administratively by the
PBOC, sometimes at a much lower level to subsidize the development of certain priority
industries or loss-making enterprises,232 commercial banks have no way to discipline un-
sustainable borrowers by interest rates. Actually, even under the floating rate system, banks
are not allowed to raise their lending rates when they lend to large SOEs. In the September
1999 widening of rate floating for lending to small- and medium-sized enterprises, the
PBOC clearly stated that lending rates for loans to the 512 key SOEs should not be floated
upward. 233
To make matters worse, interest rates in China have never been determined according
to the price level and the supply and demand of funds. Many characteristics reflected in the
223. See Hongru, supra note 70.
224. See id.
225. Interim Regulations on Bank Administration, supra note 112, art. 45. The article authorizes state specialized
banks to decide the interbank lending interest rates.
226. Id. art. 42.
227. PBOC, Interim Provisions on Interest Rate Administration [lily guanli zhanxing guiding] (Dec. 1990).
228. Commerical Banking Law, art. 4.
229. Id. art. 31.
230. PBOC, Provisions on RMB Interest Rate Administration [renminbi lily guanli guiding] (Mar. 2, 1999)
[hereinafter 1999 Interest Rate Provisions].
23 1. Id. arts. 5-6.
232. There were more than thirty preferential rates around 1995. See, e.g., INTEREsT RATE LIBERALIZATION
AND MONEY MARKET DEVELOPMENT 19 (Mehran et al. eds., 1996).
233. See Zhou Rongfan & Chao Deyun, The Reform and Development of China's Floating Interest Rate System
[woguofudong lily zhidu de gaige hefazhan], 10 CHINA FIN. 23, 24 (1998). The PBOC also excluded individual
housing loans, preferential loans, and loans from policy banks from the application of floating interest rates.
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structure of interest rates in other countries-differentials for risk, maturity, inflationary
expectations, and the opportunity costs of alternative investments-are not yet fully re-
flected in China's rate structure. Rather, interest rates are determined according to a com-
bination of price levels, the cost for banks to absorb funds, and the bearing capacity of
enterprises. According to a 1996 World Bank report, China's interest rate policy "fulfills a
complex set of objectives, reflecting the authorities' 'revealed preferences' with respect to
distribution of subsidies to various productive activities, groups and regions; policies for
industrial and agricultural development; and resource transfer from depositors to the state
or other borrowers.234
Further, because of the government's intention to use higher interest rates to mobilize
savings while at the same time providing cheap credit to enterprises, the interest margin
received by China's commercial banks is narrow and sometimes even negative. 235 The mar-
gin between one-year working capital loans and one-year household deposits has system-
atically declined since 1982. Consequently, even according to official statistics, the rate of
return on bank assets has been falling and turned negative for the first time in 1996. This
deterioration occurred despite the fact that many banks treat accrued (but often unpaid)
interest as paid income, make negligible provisions for bad debt (based on instructions from
the MOF), and raise earnings through various unofficial add-on fees and service charges.
Over time, the result has been a steady de-capitalization of the banks.2s 6 The government
continues its policy to sacrifice the banks for economic growth. This is evidenced in the
seven consecutive interest rate cuts from May 1996 to July 1999, and also by the limited
application of floatable interest rates. To stimulate economic growth, interest rates were
consecutively cut seven times from May 1996 to July 1999 (see Table 4). These seven
consecutive interest rate cuts reduced interest rate margins of Chinese banks by 0.9 per-
cent.23
c. The Prospectus of Liberalizing Interest Rates in China
Chinese authorities are determined to liberalize RMB interest rates. As early as 1993, a
limited scope for interest rate administration system reform was defined.23 The State Coun-
cil's Resolution on Financial Reform in 1993 called for a reform of interest rate policies
and vested the power to formulate policy decisions in the PBOC under the leadership of
the State Council.'3s The PBOC, accordingly, formulated a plan to liberalize interest rates
234. WORLD BANK COUNTRY SURVEY, supra note 125, at 24.
235. See, e.g., China's Central Banker Talks up Bank, Interest Rate Reform, Oct. 12, 1999, at http://
www.chinaonline.com.
236. See, e.g., World Bank, supra note 44.
237. Dai Xianglong, Improve Financial Services to Assist Reform and Progress of SOEs in Accordance with the
Guideline of 4th Plenary of te 15th Central Committee of CPC, 11 CHINA FIN. 4, 5 (Nov. 1999).
238. Decisions on Issues Concerning the Establishment of the Socialist Market Economy System, supra note 214. It
was stated that the central bank should adjust the basic interest rate in a timely fashion according to the demand
and supply of funds in the market, and allow the deposit and lending rates of commercial banks to float within
a limited margin. Id.
239. See State Council, Resolution of State Council on Financial System Reform No. 91, § 4 (1993) [here-
inafter Resolution on Financial System Reform]. It is stipulated that the PBOC should set a ceiling for deposit
rates and a floor for lending rates; streamline the relationship of deposit rates, lending rates, and interest rates
for securities; set different interest rates according to maturity, cost, and risk, and maintain reasonable differ-
entials between these rates; and try to establish a market-oriented interest rate system based on the central
bank rate. Id.
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in three stages,214 with the interbank market rate liberalization as the first stage, followed
by the lending rate liberalization, and finally deposit rate liberalization. 41
Progress has been made in this area. Since June 1, 1996, ceilings on interbank lending
interest rates have been abolished. 42 With the establishment and improvement of floating
rate systems, financial institutions can now charge different interest rates on the basis of
their borrowers' creditworthiness within the floating scope.2 43 Since September 21, 2000,
financial institutions are allowed to set their foreign currency lending rates in line with the
international market; rates on foreign currency deposits of more than $3 million are also
liberalized. T" The liberalization of interest rates, however, so far has not touched the foun-
dation of the interest rate control system in China. Commercial banks in China must set
their RMB deposit and lending rates pursuant to the ceiling and floor interest rates defined
by the PBOC.2 45 Moreover, except for short-term loans, banks and other financial institu-
tions are not even allowed to decide how interest shall be calculated, paid, or collected. 46
There is still a long way to go before interest rate control can be completely abolished.
A World Bank survey lists five preconditions for successful interest rate liberalization, that
is a financially sound real sector (in China, mainly SOEs); banks with positive net worth;
bank management with high quality, regulatory, and supervisory standards; and a gradual
process.2 47 While China has made considerable progress in all these areas, the weak financial
health of segments of the state enterprise sector and the deteriorating quality of banks'
assets, however, suggest that interest liberalization cannot be achieved in China quickly.24s
D. WEAK INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS WITHIN STATE COMMERCIAL BANKS
1. The Importance of Internal Controls
Internal controls are systems established to provide reasonable assurance of effective and
efficient operations, reliable financial information and reporting, and compliance with laws
and regulations.49 A bank's internal controls can ensure capital adequacy and minimize
market, transfer, and credit risk, and, by extension, secure the health of a banking system.
The importance of internal systems has been widely recognized, especially after the text-
book case of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International collapse.5 0 William J.
240. See generally Ping Xie, Toward a Market-Oriented Interest Rate Policy in the Transformation of China's
Economy, in INTEREST RATE LIBERALIZATION AND MONEY MARKET DEVELOPMENT, supra note 232, at 19.
241. It is important to put deposit interest rates liberalization after the lending rates liberalization. Without
a prior or simultaneous freeing of lending rates, freeing deposit rates would result in a substantial squeeze on
bank margins, drastically reducing their already low level of profits.
242. Dai,supra note 210.
243. See Dai Xianglong: China to Adopt Market Interest Rates, Jan. 24, 2000, at http://www.chinaonline.com.
244. See, e.g., James Kynge, Beijing Move on Foreign Currency, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 5, 2000.
245. Commercial Banking Law, arts. 31, 38.
246. For details of how interests should be calculated, paid, or collected, see 1999 Interest Rate Provisions,
supra note 230, arts. 11-29.
247. WORLD BANK COUNTRY SURVEY, supra note 125, box 3.1.
248. Dai Xianglong was reported to predict a three-year period for decontrolling interest rate. He said the
main reason for the caution is that poor asset quality of China's four largest state banks could put them at
disadvantage in competing with smaller but more efficient private banks. See James Kynge, China to Liberalize
Rates Regime within Three Years, FIN. TIMES (London), July 19, 2000.
249. See, e.g., INTERNAL CONTROLS IN BANKING 1 (Ray Kinsella ed., 1995).
250. It is concluded that the BCCI collapse shows how, in the absence of effective internal controls and a
compliance "culture," fraud and dissimulation will inevitably flourish. See, e.g., John F. Mogg, Internal Controls:
The EC Response to BCCI, in INTERNAL CONTROLS IN BANKING, supra note 249.
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McDonough, Chairman of the Basle Committee and President of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, stated that "the Basle committee has been focusing on ways of strengthening
internal controls at banks in recognition of the fact that internal control deficiencies con-
tinue to be a source of major problems and significant losses for banks globally."2,
2. Weak Internal Controls of China's State Banks
Banks under heavy administrative controls often do not have the opportunity to develop
their risk-management capacities. In Japan, for example, tight controls of bank behavior by
regulators had long been a substitute for risk management by banks themselves and for
monitoring by shareholders and depositors. When the controls were successively relaxed
in the 1970s and 1980s, a vacuum emerged in bank risk management."' This might have
been a factor behind massive lending into real estate-related activities ofJapanese banks in
the 1980s, where credit analysis was just a matter of estimating the future path of real estate
prices. " This is the case for Chinese banks (especially state commercial banks) as well.
After decades of extending loans largely at the behest of political leaders, the banks have
not accumulated sufficient experience in real commercial banking.5 4
According to a 1996 World Bank report about China, China's state commercial banks
are handicapped by such operational deficiencies as the absence of key management pro-
cesses (planning, budgeting, reporting); lack of familiarity with asset and liability manage-
ment techniques; inadequate accounting standards that render performance and risk as-
sessment difficult; substandard information systems; inappropriate internal incentives
systems for staff; and poorly articulated institutional structures and legal frameworks."'
These are needed to underpin a sound system of corporate governance, eliminate interfer-
ence and conflicts of interest, increase management autonomy, and protect the interests of
owners and depositors.
These weak internal controls led to the accumulation of NPLs.256 The PBOC launched
an inspection at the end of 1998 into fifty branches of state banks where there had been
sharp increases in bad debts and found serious problems including:" 'chaotic' internal man-
agement, 'blind lending', falsifying [NPL] data, severe dereliction of duty and 'fraud for
self-interest.' "257 More seriously, weak internal control systems have led to numerous in-
stances of corruption and fraud by bank officials,"' as well as misdemeanors by bank man-
251. Press Release, Basle Committee, The Basle Committee Issues a Framework for Internal Control Sys-
tems in Banking Organization (Sept. 22, 1998), available at http://www.bis.org/press/p980922a.htm.
252. Even as of 1996, banks were reluctant to go ahead with self-assessment of their loan portfolio because,
in their view, this would involve much preparation on their part. See Kazuo Ueda, The Japanese Banking Crisis
in the 1990s, in STRENGTHENING THE BANKING SYSTEM IN CHINA: ISSUES AND EXPERIENCE 251, 259 n.7 (BIS
Policy Papers No. 7, Oct. 1999).
253. Id. at 256.
254. A senior partner at PriceWaterhouse was reported as saying: "China's bankers are still ill-equipped to
evaluate the quality of new loans." Long and Slow Road Ahead for Banking System Reform, H.K. STANDAP,Jan.
31, 1997.
255. WORLD BANK COUNTRY SURVEY, supra note 125, at 34-35.
256. See, e.g., Zhaoxing Wang, Financial Supervision: Opportunities and Challenge [inrongjianguan:fanzhang
yu tiaozhan], 12 CHINA FIN. 18 (Dec. 1999); and Shusheng Kang, Commercial Banks' Internal Controls: Borrowing
and Innovation [shangye yinhang neikong zhidu:jijian yu chuangxing], 3 (1999).
257. China Pledges Tough Measures to Combat NPLs-Report, DowJONES INT'L NEWS, Mar. 19, 1999;James
Harding, China Banks Sack Managers, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 20, 1999.
258. See, e.g., James Harding, Officials Arrested over Chinese Fraud Scandal, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 5,
1999, at Asia-Pac. 5; and China: Corruption May Threaten State, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 5, 1999.
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agers. s9 A survey conducted at the end of 1998 divided the loan assets in one of the big
four into loans under credit plans or government instruction and loans granted at the full
discretion of the bank. It discovered that more NPLs were created via lending at the full
discretion of the bank, both in absolute amount and in proportion to the whole loans, than
were created via lending under credit plans or government instructions.2 60
China's state commercial banks are striving to improve their internal control systems.
To enhance internal controls within China's financial institutions, the PBOC issued Guide-
lines for Enhancing Internal Controls of Financial Institutions. 61 The Guidelines consist
of thirty-two articles in six chapters, covering internal controls of commercial banks and
nonbank financial institutions.2 62 Chinese banks are establishing and improving their inter-
nal controls in the light of the PBOC Guidelines.
The improvement of internal management systems, however, cannot be finished over-
night. Acquiring expertise and accumulating necessary data take time. Under the Com-
mercial Banking Law, a commercial bank must make a strict examination of the borrower
regarding its borrowing purpose and its ability and method of repayment.2 63 State com-
mercial banks, however, need to develop their risk-management capacity before they can
really do such examination. Currently, because banks do not have sufficient data and ex-
pertise to examine the creditworthiness of their borrowers and the proposed projects, they
just simply take security for loans as required by the Commercial Banking Law without
examining the repayment capability of the guarantor, the ownership and value of the mort-
gaged or pledged asset, and the feasibility of realizing the mortgage or pledge.264 That is
one of the reasons why most of the loans went to SOEs, because many SOEs, though they
might have bad cash flow, have extensive assets and can always come up with collateral for
loans.216 This kind of asset-driven lending has led to the accumulation of NPLs and reflects
the weak risk management capacity of China's state commercial banks.
E. INAPPROPRIATE BANKING REGULATION SUPERVISION
External regulation, especially prudential regulation and supervision, is critical to ensure
the safety and soundness of individual banks and the whole banking system. The failure of
prudential regulation and supervision will foster irregularities and over-risk-taking by
banks. The failure of the PBOC to develop a prudential supervisory regime has been widely
recognized as one of the causes of accumulation of NPLs on state commercial banks' bal-
ance sheets.2 66
259. See James Kynge, Report Reveals Banking Abuses, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 17, 1999, at Asia-Pac. 9;
and China Auditor Uncovers Irregularities at Two State Banks, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS, Dec. 16, 1999.
260. See, e.g., Haining Zhang & Haijie Ouyan, How Can State Commercial Banks Prevent Credit Risks [guoyou
shangyeyinbangfangfan xingdaifenxiang de chulv zai nahl?, 10 CHINA FIN. (Beijing) 34, 34 (1999).
261. PBOC, Guidelines of the PBOC for Enhancing Internal Controls of Financial Institutions [zhongguo
renmin yinhang jiaqiang jinrong jiguo neibu kongzhi de zhidao yuanze] (May 16, 1997) [hereinafter Internal
Control Guidelines].
262. Id. art. 4.
263. Commercial Banking Law, art. 35.
264. Id. art. 36. This article requires that, except for loans to borrowers with high credit ratings and capability
of repayment, a commercial bank shall extend a loan against a security, and conduct strict examination of the
repaying capability of the guarantor, the ownership and value of the mortgaged or pledged asset, and the
feasibility of the realization of the mortgage or pledge. See also General Lending Rules, supra note 134, art. 10.
265. See, e.g., Anthony Neoh, Rethink Asia: Reality Check, FAR E. EcoN. Rsv., May 6, 1999, at 46.
266. Wang, supra note 256.
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The PBOC in China, involved in formulating and enforcing credit plans for such a long
time, shifted to the prudential regime just a few years ago.267 Besides, the government's
interference in credit allocation not only circumvented the need for thorough risk assess-
ment by the banks, made the government co-responsible for the quality of banks' assets,
and provided an implicit government guarantee on banks' liabilities, but also constrained
the supervisors in their ability to penalize banks for making bad lending decisions. Thus,
although bank supervision activities in China date from May 1985, when PBOC established
its department of bank supervision and examination,268 the PBOC failed to develop pru-
dential supervision on banks until the mid-1990s.
2 69
The 1995 Central Banking Law authorized PBOC to exercise supervision and control
over the financial industry27° and clarified the PBOC's supervisory scope. " ' The PBOC's
role in regulating and supervising the financial industry was later redefined by the State
Council. The regulation and supervision of securities businesses and insurance companies
was taken from the PBOC in 1998 with State Council's decision to make the CSRC the
sole organization to supervise the country's securities industry,272 and the establishment of
the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC).273 As a result, the current financial
regulations and supervision are carried out by three agencies under the State Council: the
PBOC,27 4 CSRC, and CIRC carry out their respective regulatory and supervisory respon-
267. As recognized by many Chinese commentators, the prudential regime and the credit plan are a mis-
match in both theory and practice. See, e.g., CHINESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM 31-38 (Chen Yuan ed., 1994);
and WeihongJin, An Empirical Study of Debt-Capital Ratio Management as Introduced by China's Specialized Banks,
3 GUANLI SHIJIE 44 (1996).
268. This department, known as the Examination and Supervision Department, had more than 4,700 per-
sonnel by the end of 1988. Among them, however, only about 200 were at the level of senior economist or
senior accountant with slightly more than 1,200 in the middle grades. WORLD BANK, supra note 162, at 33.
269. Prior to 1995, the PBOC mainly focused on licensing and authorization. Wang, supra note 256, at 16.
270. Central Banking Law, art. 2.
271. Id. arts. 30-36.
272. The CSRC began in 1992 as the executive branch of the State Council Securities Commission, which
supervised the securities market. In 1997, the CSRC was charged with supervising the Shanghai and Shenzhen
stock exchanges. In 1998, as part of the government's effort to streamline the bureaucracy, the SCSC and the
CSRC were merged as CSRC. According to a decision of the State Council in October 1998, the new CSRC
enjoys ministerial rank and performs as the sole regulatory agency for the securities industry in China, re-
sponsible for overseeing securities brokerages, which were formerly supervised by the PBOC; directly admin-
istering all local securities supervisory bodies, which used to be under local governments; and undertaking the
responsibilities of the SCSC. The new commission also regulates all international participation in China's
burgeoning securities sector. China Approves Regulatory Body for Securities Sector, Oct. 20, 1998, at http://
www.chinaonline.com.
273. On November 18, 1998, China formally established an insurance regulatory body, the China Insurance
Regulatory Commission (CIRC). The insurance industry was previously supervised by the PBOC. The newly
established CIRC is subject directly to the State Council and fully authorized to regulate and supervise China's
insurance industry. Its responsibility includes the drafting and adoption of policies, regulations, and rules about
commercial insurance; supervising insurance enterprises to ensure that they carry their businesses in accordance
with the law and regulation; fostering fair competition between insurance enterprises; promoting insurance
risk assessing and early warning systems, etc. See Tian Li, The CIRC Was Established in Beijing Today [Zhongguo
BaoxianJiandu WeiyuanhuiZaiJing Chengli], PEOPLE's DAILY (Overseas Ed.), Nov. 19, 1999, at 1.
274. In October 1999, what under the PBOC supervision was three policy banks, the big four, nine joint
stock commercial banks, eighty-eight city commercial banks, more than 50,000 rural credit cooperatives, about
3,100 urban credit cooperatives, nonbank financial institutions, and foreign-invested financial institutions not
under the supervision of CSRC or CIRC. See Baoqing Wang, The Enhancing Financial Supervision andAdmin-
istration in China [changyin zaishou- woguo jinrongjianguan buduanjiaqiang], JINRONG SHIBAo, Oct. 10, 1999,
at 1.
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sibilities in the banking, securities, and insurance industries. The division of duties among
these agencies allows the PBOC to concentrate on banking regulation.
So far, the PBOC is implementing its prudential supervision over commercial banks on
the following three fronts.275 First, capital adequacy and asset-liability ratio supervision was
implemented. In 1994, the PBOC issued a set of new prudential ratios in pilot form to
guide the operations of banks and nonbank financial institutions.276 The 1995 Commercial
Banking Law legitimized the asset-liability management ratios requirements.277 On Decem-
ber 12, 1996, the PBOC issued Monitoring and Supervisory Indexes of Asset-Liability Ratio
Management for Commercial Banks,278 further detailing the ratios set by the Commercial
Banking Law, and added new ratio management requirements, covering market risk and
off-balance sheet items. Second, supervision of asset quality, liquidity, and profitability was
implemented. The PBOC has designed a set of indicators to monitor the asset quality,
liquidity, and profitability of commercial banks.179 Since 1998, a five-level loan classification
system based on risk-management has been introduced.8 0 Third, a policy of promoting
internal controls within commercial banks has been implemented. As mentioned above, the
PBOC issued Guidelines on Enhancing Internal Controls of Financial Institutions in 1997,
requiring commercial banks to improve their internal control systems in accordance with
the guidelines.
The prudential regulation and supervision of the PBOC on commercial banks, however,
is at a very early stage. So far, the PBOC relies heavily on punishing irregularities after the
fact rather than prevention.2"'
F. SUMMARY
All the problems pointed out above have a negative impact upon the conditions of market
discipline for banks and SOEs. The empirical analyses support the conclusion of the theo-
retical framework section, that is, the deterioration of conditions for market discipline is
the ultimate cause of bank NPL problems in China. Because market discipline cannot really
work on banks (especially state commercial banks) and SOEs, budget constraints no longer
bite, which results in unsustainable borrowing by SOEs and continuous creation of NPLs
by banks.
1. The Captive Financial Markets
The financial markets in China are extremely captive rather than open and competitive.
Households and enterprises do not have many alternatives but to deposit or save their extra
money with state banks.
Banks are facing a captive market as well. Massive administrative controls on banks ac-
tually have deprived banks of the freedom to make lending decisions on commercial stan-
275. Liu, supra note 249.
276. Asset-LiabilityManagement Circular, supra note 215.
277. Commercial Banking Law, art. 39.
278. PBOC, Monitoring and Supervisory Indexes of Asset-Liability Ratio Management for Commercial
Banks [shangye yinhang zhichan fuzhai bili guanli jiankong, jianche zhibiaol (Dec. 12, 1996).
279. Id.
280. Kynge, supra note 136.
281. It is reported that China's financial authorities have fired bank managers and revoked Communist Party
membership of some officials who were not controlling or were trying to cover up rising levels of NPLs. China
Pledges Tough Measures to Combat NPLs-Report, supra note 257; and Harding, supra note 257.
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dards. State banks had very limited freedom in deciding to whom they lend under the credit
plan (credit ceiling). Although the credit ceiling has been removed since 1998, state com-
mercial banks are still forced to lend to unbankable projects and loss-making SOEs in the
name of policy loans.
2. The Information Problem
The information problem is not exclusive to the socialist economy. This problem, how-
ever, bears unique features in socialist economies: the main difference between the socialist
and capitalist economies on the issue of information is not accuracy or comprehensiveness
of the information, but the utilization of the information. In capitalist economies, the in-
formation is utilized in a decentralized way. Those using the information feel the benefits
of it directly. Under socialist economies before reform, attempts were made to centralize
crumbs of knowledge and information that had been scattered in all directions, and if the
information in the subordinate's possession had to be "passed up the ladder," it might not
be in his interest to transmit it, and he might fail to do so out of laziness; or it might be
fully in his interest to pass it up in a distorted form. This explains why the information
problem is more serious in formerly planned economies." 2
The lack of incentives to use information survives the economic reform. Enterprises,
especially SOEs, knowing that banks will sooner or later lend to them under a credit plan,
have no incentive to produce favorable information about their financial situation, let alone
unfavorable information. Banks, aware that they have to lend to certain enterprises or proj-
ects under the credit plan, do not have incentives to evaluate borrowers' creditworthiness
and monitor borrowers' cash flow. Besides, the inappropriate prudential regulation is not
enough of an external check that banks examine their borrowers' creditworthiness properly.
In addition to the incentive problem, the veracity of the information also poses a serious
problem. The underdeveloped accounting rules and disclosure practices have impeded
banks from obtaining reliable information about their borrowers." 3 Actually, even if they
obtained the relevant information, their immature internal controls and risk-management
ability are still obstacles for them to evaluate the financial situation of their borrowers
properly.
3. The Bailout Expectation
The implicit and explicit government guarantees-soft budget constraints in China-
encourage banks and SOEs to resort to government bailout whenever they encounter dif-
ficulties. The economic reform has substantially reduced budget subsidies, soft tax, and
price subsidies on SOEs; the soft budget constraints, however, are far from having been
eradicated. Rather, they are now mainly in the form of soft credit from banks. Banks are
still lending to loss-making SOEs under formal or informal government intervention.
4. The Irresponsibility to Market Signals by Borrowers
Borrowers' ignorance of market signals can be traced to soft budget constraints. The soft
budget constraints render the firm's interest in cost and profit very weak. Actually, even if
282. See KORNAI, supra note 47, at 129-30.
283. A random state audit of 100 SOEs in China found that eighty-one of the companies reported false
assets worth RMB 3.8 billion and eighty-nine SOEs reported false profits worth RMB 2.7 billion in 1999. To
make matters worse, previous audits of the 100 SOEs by eighty-two public auditing firms found nothing awry
with the accounts of sixty-two of the firms, which seriously undermines confidence in public auditors. See
Random Audit Exposes Accounting Fraud in Most Chinese SOEs, Dec. 27, 1999, at http://www.chinaonline.com.
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the borrowers have the incentives to respond to interest rate signals, the interest rates in
China are not signaling properly. The real interest rate in China is persistently and pur-
posely negative, and the banks are not allowed to adjust the interest rates freely. Where the
real interest rate is negative, anyone who takes up a loan from the bank can pocket a small
donation from the bank. Every practical argument speaks in favor of getting as deeply in
debt as possible.
V. Policy Recommendations
China's NPL problem is not limited to individual banks; rather, it is pervasive in all state
commercial banks. NPLs not only have negative effects on state commercial banks, but also
on the economic reform and real economic growth. And, because the number and amounts
of NPLs are so huge, the big four have been technically insolvent for several years. Given
their weight in the whole financial system, the NPL problem with state commercial banks
is threatening the stability of the whole financial system, and even the whole economy.
The causes of NPLs with state commercial banks are also systematic. The state bank-
dominated financial system, the bank-centric finance, the soft credit to SOEs in the form
of policy loans, and administrative controls on banks have resulted in weak internal controls
in banks and inappropriate prudential supervision on banks. In other words, China's NPL
problem is actually a reflection of weaknesses in its financial and corporate sectors and
requires a systematic solution.25 4
Based on the analyses of the seriousness of and causes of the Chinese commercial banks'
NPL problem, the author would like to make the following policy recommendations.
A. THE NPL PROBLEM MUST BE SOLVED IMMEDIATELY
According to some observers, restructuring Chinese banks before the underlying causes
of the accumulation of bad loans are removed would be close to useless. Restructuring
SOEs-that is, reforming these firms and imposing upon them hard budget constraints-
should be the first step. This, in turn, would require discharging SOEs from the respon-
sibility of providing a broad range of social services, shifting such costs directly to the
budget: the accompanying increase in public expenditure should be matched by a corre-
sponding increase in tax revenues. At the present time, when the growth of the Chinese
economy has slowed and public confidence in the economy, for a variety of reasons, is low,
it is definitely not the right time for hastening real reform of the SOEs, and hence there
should be no rush to undertake a radical reform of the Chinese financial sector."' However,
this should not be used as an excuse for doing nothing until an unlikely "Big Bang" turns
the Chinese economy around.
First, as indicated before, NPLs accumulated in the books of the big four threaten the
stability of China's financial system. Second, because of the bank-centric feature of China's
284. LARDY, supra note 20.
285. Lau, supra note 37, at 84. That author, after analyzing the fiscal situation of China (using indicators
such as the size of the annual government total and current deficit, the public demand for public debt, the
fiscal capacity for servicing the public debt, the lending and bond-buying capacity of the banking system, and
public confidence in the banking system and the currency), concluded that the Chinese economy is not in
imminent danger of financial collapse, despite the existence of a significant stock of NPLs. The system is
sustainable for at least another decade or longer. Id. at 80-85.
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financial system, it is widely recognized that if banks continue to be trapped with NPLs,
they will not be able to finance economic growth. Last but not least, transparent accounting
and clear assignment of responsibilities can be a powerful instrument for making sure that
SOEs are eventually restructured. Banks with clean balance sheets will have more incentives
to monitor and impose financial discipline on their borrowers. That is essential for SOE
restructuring in China.
The Chinese government has tried to harden soft budget constraints on SOEs since the
beginning of economic reform. The efforts of the government, however, have achieved
little. In his opening speech of the annual session of the NPC in 1999, Zhu Rongji, China's
premier minister, admitted that "financial discipline is lax and economic order is somewhat
in disarray" and ordered local authorities and state banks to stop lending to all but a few
industry projects: "[w]ith the exception of a number of projects designed to raise the tech-
nological level of production, upgrade products and manufacture marketable products, gov-
ernment at all levels should stop examining and approving industrial development projects
and banks should stop granting loans to them.""' Without solving the NPL problem within
state commercial banks, it is predictable that adverse selection of state bank managers will
not be uncommon. Insolvent state commercial banks with large exposure to SOEs will have
to lend to loss-making SOEs if they do not want to be pulled down by the collapse of their
large borrowers. In other words, it is impossible to expect state commercial banks trapped
with NPLs to exercise financial discipline on SOEs if NPLs cannot be removed from their
balance sheets.
To solve the problem, four Asset Management Companies (AMCs) have been set up to
take NPLs from the big four state commercial banks.287 By the end of June 2000, the four
AMCs have taken over RMB 1.3 trillion (U.S.$157 billion) from the big four.2s8 The re-
moval of NPLs from the banks' books should at least, to some extent, release banks' NPL
burden and solve the adverse selection problem.
B. ENTERPRISE DEBT RESTRUCTURING
The problem with banks and SOEs is so interwoven that it can only be solved together.
Lardy contributes the declining profitability, the declining capital adequacy, and the in-
creasing share of NPLs of the big four to the point that a large and growing share of SOEs
are unable to service their borrowings.8 9 Thus, without SOE reform, the NFL problem
will not be worked out.2 9
0
286. James Harding, China Tackles Bad Management, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 6, 1999.
287. China opened all four AMCs within a span of about six months. The Cinda AMC was set up to tackle
the debts of the CCB in April 1999, and has already signed debt-equity deals with a number of SOEs. In
October 1999, the Dongfang (Orient) AMC was started to handle the debt of the BOC, the China Great Wall
AMC was set up to take on the bad debt of the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), and China Huarong AMC
was launched to clear the debt of the ICBC. See, e.g., China's Fourth Asset Management Company Ready to Roll,
Oct. 20, 1999, at http://www.chinaonline.com.
288. See, e.g., Conversion Diversion: No Timetable Set to Float Renminbi, China Central Banker Eyhorts, July 19,
2000, at http://www.chinaonline.com.
289. See LARDY, supra note 22, at 17-18.
290. It is commonly recognized that financial reform and SOEs reform in China must be harmonized. See,
e.g., IMF, World Economic Outlook, World Economic and Financial Survey (May 1999); Moody's Investors
Service, Banking System Outlook: China, 3 (Aug. 1999); and Zongyu Wen & Qingmin Zhao, On FinancialReform
and SOls' Strategic Restructuring [shenhuajinrong tizhi gaige yu guoyou qiye zhanlexing gaizbul, 12 CHINA FIN. 9,
9 (1999); and Yuan, supra note 267, at 19-20.
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Authorities in China have recognized the importance of debt restructuring. Following
the establishment of the four AMCs, the State Economic and Trade Commission an-
nounced the initiation of the debt-equity swap scheme on August 3, 1999.29 The scheme
authorized the four AMCs and the State Development Bank (SDB) to forgive debts owed
by SOEs in exchange for equity stakes in the enterprises. 92 By January 24, 2000, seventy-
eight enterprises had entered into debt-equity swap agreements or frame agreements293
with AMCs or the SDB for the swap debts worth RMB 112.2 billion.294
C. ENDEAVORS MUST BE AKEN TO PREVENT THE CREATION OF NEW NPLs
The seriousness of the NPL problem with state banks is not limited to the massive
existing NPLs on the banks' books. The continuous creation of new NPLs is complicating
the problem. Endeavors must be taken to control the creation of new NPLs. To achieve
this, state commercial banks must be freed from making policy loans, unnecessary admin-
istrative controls on state banks must be removed, prudential regulation and supervision
must be strengthened, and efforts must be made to promote internal controls within state
commercial banks, especially the risk-management ability. More importantly, to foster com-
petitive and open financial markets, China should continue its financial liberalization.
D. ENHANCING MARKET DISCIPLINE SHOULD BE THE MAIN THEME IN NPL WORKOUT
AND PREVENTION
The lack of market discipline underpins macro and micro reasons for the accumulation
of, and the increase in, NPLs in China. Without the restoration of market discipline, the
NPL problem cannot be solved.
Following this conclusion, the procedures designed to work out NPLs must be aimed at
restoring market discipline in China rather than simply employing government bailout.
Even if there has to be government bailout, a cutoff date must be set up so that banks will
have to take full responsibility for NPLs occurring after that date.
Besides, although prudential regulation is an effective curb on the creation of new NPLs,
the regulation and supervision of banks, however, should not suppress the function of mar-
ket discipline. For the banking system as a whole, the big issue is to transform state deposit-
taking institutions with government-driven lending practices into independent commercial
banks. This is the only way we can stop the creation of new NPLs.
291. See generally Tao Guangxiong, Focus of State-Owned Enterprise Reform: Converting Debts into Shares Helps
Ease Difficulties in State-Owned Enterprise Reform, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Sept. 18, 1999, available at 1999
WL 26443497.
292. See Xia Li, The Scope and Preconditions for Candidate Enterprises for the Debt-Equity Swap Scheme [sbisbi
zhaizhuanggu qiye defangweiyu tiaojian],JINGRONG SIIBAO, Sept. 15, 1999, at 12.
293. Often a more detailed agreement will be signed later based on the framework agreement. The Second
Auto Group, for example, signed a framework debt-equity swap agreement with all four AMCs and the SDB
on December 30, 1999; a detailed agreement was later signed in April 2000. See China Second Auto Works to
Swap Debt for Equity, Jan. 3, 2000, at http://www.chinaonline.com.
294. See Lan Luo, The Goal of SOEs Going out of Red in Three Years Is Expected to Be Achieved This Year [Guoqi
Sannina Taikun mubiaojinjiang ke ruqi shixian], PEOPLE'S DAILY (Overseas Ed.), Jan. 26, 2000, at 1.
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